1) All your statistics and babble about the tactics still doesn't negate the assertion that because the invading German army couldn't get sufficient petrol, ammo, and basic support items to its advancing forces, the assault in Russia failed.
Armies might fight, but to get the troops to fight, they need beans, bullets, and fuel on a regular basis, and if any of those is insufficiently replenished over time, they wither on the vine and die.
Oh, "babble", eh? Did you get up on the wrong side of the bed?
If you can provide me with proper evidence that would back up your claim, I'll consider your "assertion".
1) It was about setting the wrong priorities, about bad weather and about Russian resistance that had started to stiffen. The former (wrong priorities) goes for the decision to deprive Group Center of vital forces, and redirecting them to the North (Leningrad) and to Army Group South (Ukraine etc.), where the latter crossed the Mius on September 17 and captured Taganrog and then halted its operations, as heavy rain kicked in, so that its 1.Panzerarmee could not push under these Russian mud conditions. Only on November 17, when ground frost had kicked in, the German tank army could start to push to Rostov again and take it. The Russian counter-attack pushed the Germans out of Rostov, basically by performing a large pincer movement from the North, which threatened to cut off the troops inside Rostov, so Rundstedt ordered the evacution of the perimeter - against Hitler's order - and got sacked for it.
Army Group Center faced similar conditions. On top of that, they had to dance with the reduced force pool.
Fuel supply was ok during 1941, the Germans only faced 1 major hold-up in 1942, where an entire Tank Corps (can't remember which one) came to a grinding halt, because fuel could not be hurled their way in time.
The Germans had brought large amounts of fuel to rear areas to prevent such hold-ups, this practice can be seen on pictures from 1942, where you can see thousands of barrels (my personal guess would be 10k or more) placed negiglently in an hinterland area, pretty much in the open, without any AA cover (nowhere to be seen on these pictures, at least), in order to maintain the fuel supply for tank groups and motor pools and to relieve the pressure from the German railway during high consumption phases (offensives). If the Russian air force would have known that such huge amounts were stored in the open, they could have had some fun.
Food supplies were ok, the Germans also confiscated pigs, cattle and grain along the way, so that they didn't have to wait for the divisional supply trains (as in baggage, not railroad train) to catch up and to compensate for the expanding supply lines.
Ammunition supplies were a different matter, as the German armament industry was in the process of increasing the production output and as stocks had dwindled during August and September (Smolenks), and as the Russian roalroad network was less dense. There was a major shortage of rifle rounds in 1941, afaik, I can't remember in what sectors, though.
Some numbers detailing supply handling:
One (railroad) train car could hold:
- 350.000 rifle rounds (single rounds, not in clips, not in belts) or
- 250.000 MG-rounds (belts) or
- 9.500 Stick hand grenades or
- 1.000 rounds for the Pak 7,5 cm or
- 500 rounds (projectiles + propellant charges) for the le. Feldhaubitze 10,5 cm or
- 200 rounds ( " + " ) for the schwere Feldhaubitze 15 cm or
- 500 rounds for the Flak 8,8 cm or
- 10.000 rounds for the Pak / Flak 3,7 cm.
The allowed max length of a given supply train amounted to 550 meters in 1940, more powerful trains becoming available in 1941 and better road beds may have allowed for longer trains later on. At 550 m length, the net weight was 500 tons (850 tons gross weight).
A sample chart from November 1941, displaying the required daily amount of supply trains that were needed on the East Front and the number of trains that actually arrived on schedule:
....................................................... Req. no. of trains ............................... trains arrived
Army Group North ................................... 20................................................. 19
Army Group Center ................................. 32................................................. 16
Army Group South .................................. 22................................................. 15
________________________________________________________________
Total: ........................................................ 74.................................................... 50
Since the Leningrad siege had started on September 8, 1941, the German expenditure of ammunition and fuel had decreased and major movements decreased, so that the required number of daily supply trains was lower than Group Center's required amount (since Center could pick up its usual push speed again, eventually, after ground frost had kicked in). Army Group South had established a defensive line at the Mius, after it got driven away from Rostov, so the daily requirement matched the amount needed for a Group that's rather static. Looking at the numbers, either vital supplies were prioritized to be directed towards Army Group North, or supplies could not reach Center in a timely manner, since Center was pushing "through the mud" and the railroad lines had not been re-gauged yet, so that motor engine vehicles, but then - even worse - due to the mud, horse-drawn vehicles had to jump in, before the frost period started.
Number of trains that arrived on the Eastern Front between Sept. 1941 – Jan. 1942:
Month..................trains/month.....................avg. no. of trains per day
September 1941: ...... 2093 ................................ 70
Oktober 1941 ............ 1860 ................................ 60
November 1941 ..........1701 ................................ 57
December 1941 ..........1643 ............................... 53
January 1941 ............. 1420 ................................ 46
Detail here: Since the Germans captured less Russian trucks during the onslaught than anticipated, the Germans converted ALL railroad tracks (from Russian wide gauge - 1524 mm) to the German standard gauge (1435 mm). Since the superstructures (tracks) were just nailed, Wehrmacht railroad engineers could even re-gauge the Russian tracks under field conditions, even up to immediate frontline rear areas, and in a relatively fast manner. Still, the engineers had to convert several thousand km of railway tracks, which created another delay in 1941.
When the Russians went to start their major pushes after Kursk, they had to re-gauge the rail network back to the Russian gauge.
The last chart shows that the Germans managed to get a fair amount of supply trains to the Eastern Front, and that the number of trains decreased drastically between December and January. Reasons: heavy snow, but more importantly the Russian counteroffensive, which had started on November 5, 1941, which also included a combined Partisan effort to demolish the few railway lines that supported the troops near Moscow, and which had already been re-gauged. Partisans also occupied crossroads, another reason for supplies not getting to some of the sectors, and - in that case - even ending up in Russian hands.