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Dave 'Arjuna' O'Connor

Panther Games Designer
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No GoodGuy it doesn't. Being an operational level game you have to draw the line somewhere when it comes to how much detail you model. Besides, there is only so much time in the day and I usually ask myself 'so what' and in this case the answer is 'not much'. So I'm not going to delve down into this right now. From my perspective, its good enough and there are so many other areas calling out for attention.
 

GoodGuy

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No GoodGuy it doesn't. Being an operational level game you have to draw the line somewhere when it comes to how much detail you model. Besides, there is only so much time in the day and I usually ask myself 'so what' and in this case the answer is 'not much'. So I'm not going to delve down into this right now. From my perspective, its good enough and there are so many other areas calling out for attention.
Fair enough. Understandable. I wasn't suggesting to consider this, I just tried to figure what the actual state is, as such questions are not answered by the manual (correct me if I am wrong).
 
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Very nice. This leads to the question how non--radio communication is handled code-wise.
Historically, the Germans had a lot of radios in motorized pools, and they still had a sufficient/good distribution level of radios in non-motorized units, but they actually had established a routine where they switched to using field telephones in secured sectors, but even right at frontlines asap. Afaik, it was not about a lack of radios, but rather about denying (and the fear that) the enemy to (could) read German radio chatter.
Once a given position/village was taken, the first thing a Coy's signal platoon would do, was to establish telephone connections to the Bn HQ and (from the FOB or one of his B-posts) to the Artillery section/regiment, even though the FOBs had radios at their disposal, and even though more sophisticated B-posts had radios.
The Russians had a somewhat similar routine, but they used it because the initial lack (say during the 1st and until the 2nd year) of radios had to be compensated, somehow.

For the infantry, the Bundeswehr resumed this entire routine.

So, with the German setups, a lower amount of radios (say if compared to the American situation in NW Europe in 1944-45), did not necessarily mean a lack of communication means, and therefor should not be panalized in non-motorized units.
Does the game consider this setup, or does it hand out penalties for this?
I'm a retired logistician, which among other matters, dealt with facilitating communications, both in terms of maintaining the equipment,but also in establishing the network.

What you request is a tactical input to the game which builds communications networks. It includes having the equipment, establishing communications points, and laying wires at its barest level.

Who was responsible for the operation, when in the battle were they tasked to address it, what was the typical lead time to accomplish their task, and how does that effort fit into the typical CO2 scenario duration?

I suspect the communications efforts you cite supported efforts to begin the operational combat, but weren't necessarily a standard operation during the conduct of the operational combat except possibly as it relates to communications among the higher and more static command operations in the theater.
 

GoodGuy

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What you request is a tactical input to the game which builds communications networks. It includes having the equipment, establishing communications points, and laying wires at its barest level.

Dave stated that it's not going to be addressed, which is understandable, so this is a hypothetical discussion.
Not exactly to the last wire, but yes, communication should be rendered (means considered by the code handling coordination and the code handling on-call artillery.
Example. In reality, fast recon elements (small scout cars, or maybe just a Krad unit) sent out far could have found themselves cut-off communications-wise, if they had small radios (say 5 or 10 Watts), as their transmission power was too low.
Even tank radio ranges were pretty low.
For instance, a 5 W radio from a Signal-Abteilung's "small" radio troop (in the radio Coy) had a range of 30 kilometers for voice calls, and 90 km for tapped (morsed) messages, with favorable terrain and under most favorable weather conditions, plus - length (size) of antenna (frame) and time of the day were vital parameters as well. Tapped messages could be tricky at medium and long ranges, as interferences or terrain obstacles could make the messages unreadable, easily. But these Signal elements were motorized and had larger antennas than combat vehicles, eg. tanks. Their 30 W radios had voice radio ranges of around 50 km.

But tanks did not have these (voice) ranges, the antennas were way smaller (1.4 - 2 meters), so even though radios in tanks were even more powerful than some of their (rather) stationary counterparts, their range was usually lower.
Example:
The Panther was equipped with
  • the FuG 5 SE 10 U radio (using a 2 meters rod antenna). This was in fact the designation for a set of 2 devices: 1 receiver and a 10 W transmitter. This set allowed for avg. ranges of 6.4 km (voice) and 9.6 km (Morse code), only.
Tank company commanders and platoon commanders received a 2nd UKW receiver (FuG 2), so that the radio operator could tune in to 2 frequencies at the same time.
The command versions ("Befehlswagen") of the Panther received more powerful equipment:
Next to the FuG 5 a Befehlswagen would either have the
  • FuG 7 SE 20 U (20 Watts, UKW, voice range 12.8 km, tap range 16 km, using an additional 1 .4 meter rod antenna on the center of the engine cover), or the
  • FuG 8 (30 Watts, receiver + transmitter, used for MW medium wave MORSE connections only, using a star antenna on the engine cover - range: 80 km).

So, technically, a Panther platoon or even the bulk of a Coy that wasn't accompanied by a (or lost its) Command tank, slipped out of the commanders' (Coy commander,Bn Co, div. Co, operational Co) voice radio ranges quickly, once it got outside a circle of 6.4 km. Once it got outside the 9.6 Morse range, it couldn't even use morse code anymore.
In the game, these 2 circles would equal 6 and roughly 9 squares (assuming that one square would be 1 km). That's nothing. There are maps in the game that cover sectors of 40 km (correct me if I am wrong), or even more - by now.

Say the aforementioned recon element would have spotted a large target that would have been worth to be plastered with artillery, but its radio-equipment would not have been able to reach the arty unit, let alone any friendly unit, then it had to return to get back into transmission range.
An infantry Bn routing and trapped behind enemy lines, may (after combat) not have possessed the equipment to place medium range radio calls anymore, so that friendly arty pieces from outwards couldn't be called in anymore.
In the game, such dependencies are not present. Any unit can call in bombardments all across the map on enemy units (if in arty range), and tank units that lost or never had command tank versions (to begin with) still receive orders from the Corps/Army HQ, and even if that on-map boss is 30 km away.

That said, imho, that part of the communication business should be in the game, at least. The telephone network is a whole diferent thing, and probably too much detail.
On the other hand, a division's signal Bn had a good number of radios, so large extents of the old-school telephone routine could be abstracted just by adding a delay routine that would put a delay to order execution on the division for orders from the Corps or the Army, as - after a push to a far objective - such connections had to be re-etablished first, or could just be established via morsed messages, which were kept very short and usually restricted to "mission accomplished" msgs, most likely. Once a Div. HQ was established, and once Corps signal elements connected with the unit, all comm means (encrypted teletype, encrypted morse code, radio, telephone, etc.) were then available to connect with Corps and Army. Until that point, the Division sorted its comms, connected all subordinated units (radio, phone - if possible), but sent out messengers or morsed msgs to the higher echelons (Corps, etc.).
The dash performed by Rommel in France 1940 didn't just overextend supply lines, it also created a situation where Corps signals could not catch up with his division. The Corps actually did not know where the large spearheading group was - for quite some time. And a Corps, in my books, is part of the operational command level.

Who was responsible for the operation, when in the battle were they tasked to address it, what was the typical lead time to accomplish their task, and how does that effort fit into the typical CO2 scenario duration?
  • The Corps signal element was responsible for establishing (and maintaining) the connections to the attached divisions.
  • The division's signal Bn was responsible for establishing and maintaining the connections to the regiments and their Bns. It also had to maintain a connection to the unit (division) on the right side of its parent division. That system enabled the Germans to connect the entire frontline of a Corps sector.

I suspect the communications efforts you cite supported efforts to begin the operational combat, but weren't necessarily a standard operation during the conduct of the operational combat except possibly as it relates to communications among the higher and more static command operations in the theater.
Hmm .... no. Well, fast units (say tanks or armored cars) did not unwind telephone lines from their vehicles during their pushes, of course. But divisional trains and signal elements were quite fast, when it came to establishing comm lines (with some exceptions). Inf Bns put up their (internal) phones quickly, once they got order to halt/rest/dig in.
I may create another thread covering signal procedures, if I have time.
 
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Dave stated that it's not going to be addressed, which is understandable, so this is a hypothetical discussion.

. . .

Hmm .... no. Well, fast units (say tanks or armored cars) did not unwind telephone lines from their vehicles during their pushes, of course. But divisional trains and signal elements were quite fast, when it came to establishing comm lines (with some exceptions). Inf Bns put up their (internal) phones quickly, once they got order to halt/rest/dig in.
I may create another thread covering signal procedures, if I have time.

I don't think a signals discussion would be time wasted.

CO2 is focused on World War II, but with some additions, among them adding what has become known as "dismounted operations" and a higher fidelity replication of signal communications, the engine could be used for more modern combat.

Dismounted operations, defined as the ability of a non-mobile combat formation to mount onto transport, move with the transport to a new location, and dismount for combat would allow for the inclusion of, among other things, seaborne invasions, and ad hoc river crossings in World War II scenario designs, or the inclusion of ad hoc air mobile operations in later era combats.

Particularly in later eras, coordination of ad hoc moves required a high level of coordination from ground units to higher echelons that controlled the air "taxis" that move them, and that was dependent on building and maintaining an efficient communications network.

One of the theoretical advantages the US had over the Viet Cong in the Vietnam era was the ability to maneuver quickly through the use of technological advantages such as a good communications grid.

One of the first efforts in attacking Iraqi forces in both the 1991 and 2003 US invasions revolved around taking out the static communications grid to leave Iraqi forces isolated on the battlefield from higher command.

One of the issues we had to address in developing logistics when I was working was Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I). CO2 replicates the Command, Control, and Intelligence benchmarks, and abstracts the Communications.

Your discussion of relative radio ranges is particularly important in addressing the Communications aspects and for future development, establishing standards for those would go a long way in establishing the parameters for programming in an addition when practical for the developers.
 

共工熙雲

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I don't think a signals discussion would be time wasted.

CO2 is focused on World War II, but with some additions, among them adding what has become known as "dismounted operations" and a higher fidelity replication of signal communications, the engine could be used for more modern combat.

Dismounted operations, defined as the ability of a non-mobile combat formation to mount onto transport, move with the transport to a new location, and dismount for combat would allow for the inclusion of, among other things, seaborne invasions, and ad hoc river crossings in World War II scenario designs, or the inclusion of ad hoc air mobile operations in later era combats.

Particularly in later eras, coordination of ad hoc moves required a high level of coordination from ground units to higher echelons that controlled the air "taxis" that move them, and that was dependent on building and maintaining an efficient communications network.

One of the theoretical advantages the US had over the Viet Cong in the Vietnam era was the ability to maneuver quickly through the use of technological advantages such as a good communications grid.

One of the first efforts in attacking Iraqi forces in both the 1991 and 2003 US invasions revolved around taking out the static communications grid to leave Iraqi forces isolated on the battlefield from higher command.

One of the issues we had to address in developing logistics when I was working was Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I). CO2 replicates the Command, Control, and Intelligence benchmarks, and abstracts the Communications.

Your discussion of relative radio ranges is particularly important in addressing the Communications aspects and for future development, establishing standards for those would go a long way in establishing the parameters for programming in an addition when practical for the developers.
Is not modern war already using C4I(Command, Contral, Communi Cation, intelligence ) ?
 

Shadrach

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What does "Computers" add that is not already encompassed by the other Cs? :rolleyes:
 
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What does "Computers" add that is not already encompassed by the other Cs? :rolleyes:
I wondered that myself when they changed the acronym.

The US Army command that at first managed communications equipment split its mission description to include both communications equipment and computers.

The acronym didn't only have implications for defining the methods that facilitate command and control, but also facilitated establishing funding priorities for development in the minds of both military planners and the Congressional members who had to wrestle with allocating funds for programs.

There is some basis in separating computers as the military advanced from communicating map locations using radios to portraying the battlefield situational awareness on computer-generated map overlays that accumulated reports from dispersed units and reflected the results of those reports in graphical models overlaid on maps -- not too dissimilar from what is available as CO2 situational awareness (none, current, recent, and all) intelligence displays on the battle maps.
 
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C4I, where will it all end. They should stop expanding the term to cope with changes in technology and simply refer to it as a function - ie command and control. Too many wankers wanting to have the last word and make a note for themselves.
I was often bemused when the wankers would spend more time discussing the new acronym than solving the problems inherent in the technology.

There was nothing more irritating than trying to get a consensus from my ILS Management Team, an Army-wide gathering of parties either involved in developing logistics support or being informed of those support concepts on a vehicle system, and watching the desired technical solution discussion get sidetracked by a party whose only input was to insure "we" used the "right" acronym in a briefing.

I had a hard time dealing with people who abided by "the book" without ever understanding the purpose for "the book" to begin with.
 

Grognerd

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Pretty funny!
My first week on the job (Launch site at VAFB) I got 4 acronym books! One for NASA, one for the Air Force, one for Martin Marietta (my employer) and one for the solid rocket motor folks. Could talk all day long and no one could understand a word unless they had the books!
 

Agema

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...but also facilitated establishing funding priorities...

It's funny, but the minute I read about the change of acronym, my instinctive thought was that it would have something to do with money - often someone with a project they want a load of funding thrown at.
 

JyriK

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....The second was to look into the on call arty system and see if the reports of arty staying idle for long periods were true....

Any ETA on this? Would really like to have more active on-call arty -- less micro-management.

What features have been implemented, past 1.31, to the working beta, accesible on Steam, if I may ask?
 

JyriK

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Perhaps those were silly questions?

Anyhow, I can report that with 1.31 (also with "beta") in "Race for Bastogne"-scenario it is not possible to order German on-foot HQs to move into forests, ie. they behave like they are motorized. A bug surely. Also I find it odd that the visibility at the start is only 0 meters(!), dropped from 1000m in version 1.28.
 
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