2) Battle of Suomussalmi December 7 - January 8 (Winter War, 1939/1940)
a) The actual Battle for Suomussalmi (163rd Division):
- advance on Suomussalmi with delaying Finnish rear guard actions
- 1 Soviet regiment holding the northern bank of the lake and attacking (south) across the lake
- 1 regiment advancing NW where it then gets trapped on the road
- 1 regiment defending the east of the town and the perimeter north of it
b) Battle of Raate Road (January 1 - January 7, 1940, 44th Motor. Rifle Division + NKWD Guard Regiment)
Inferior Finnish forces trap 2 Soviet divisions, basically on 2 roads and inside the town, the only usable roads to and from their goal (the Finnish town of Suomussalmi). Before, the Soviet 163th Division had managed to capture Suomussalmi, as the Finns had only 2 understrength Coys near or at the border. The Finns resorted to delaying and rearguard actions and retreated towards the town. The Finns burned down the town and retreated to the West, across the lake, so that the Soviets could capture the town without a fight, but the burned place did not offer much cover/shelter for the troops/supply trains.
With a share of the Soviet division (1 regiment?) digging in south of Suoussalmi and on its main road leading to the lake, and another regiment guarding the east of the town, the Russians commenced an attack south of the town right across an arm of the frozen lake, but failed to boot the dug in Finnish defenders on the southern bank of the lake.
The remaining regiment was then sent to the NW to capture Puolanka, where the newly arrived (fresh) Finnish Bn (Er.P 16 ) was able to fend off the Russian unit's attack, which was bound to movement on the only available road. That Russian Rgt. could only use the frozen lake as supply "road" to the command post in Suomussalmi. The only remaining supply line (the road to the east) was then cut by Finnish elements, which expanded the road block somewhat to the north, so that the Russians were trapped in the town, with only the (open/flat) lake serving as connecting route to the trapped regiment in the NW.
Since the Russians in the NW were basically trapped on the road (with trucks, heavy EQ, horses, guns, etc.), the Finns then employed a tactic that allowed for cutting the huge line of Russian troops into several isolated sections. For this task, the destruction of the Soviet division, the Finnish Supreme Command had sent Inf Regiment JR-27, so that the size of the Finnish troops (including the mentioned understrength Border Coys and the 16th Bn) in the area then roughly reached Brigade strength.
The 163rd's requests to retreat were turned down by the Russian High Command. Obviously, the High Command was not informed about (or interested in) the local weather conditions and the lack of winter clothing.
The Finns had skis, winter clothing and white camo suits which enabled them to mount numerous gun and run attacks (often at night) and maintain a high level of mobility. The RU had to rest in foxholes, makeshift tents or under vehicles, while the Finns could warm up/rest in heated tents + dugouts.
The Soviet troops lacked winter clothing, camo suits + were mostly bound to the road (+ section of the frozen lake) for movement. 1,600 (?) skis had been loaded on Russian soil, but the troops had never trained on skis so they were not used. On top of that, Finnish troops kept attacking ammo dumps + kitchen/supply detachments, which made Russian supply efforts very difficult.
In turn, the Finnish CO had ordered to build an
ice road in the deep snow which was eventually expanded to a whole road (or ski) network in the surrounding woods (partly parallel to the road) early on, just outside the Russian view, which then the Finnish ski troops could use to redeploy quickly + to supply their siege elements. This enabled the Finns to maintain the siege of these multiple pockets, but also caused panic among the Russians, as this created the false impression that they faced superior Finnish forces.
The Soviet 44th Motor. Rifle Division, the elite unit sent to relieve the 163rd, advanced on the Raate road tow. Suomussalmi but decided to dig in along the road, 10-12 km short of the town, because Finnish forces had started to attack the front of the column. The RU then tried to attack the Finnish road block in front of them, but failed to boot the defenders, while the center of their column had to defend the perimeter along the road.
Due to the appearance of the Soviet Rifle Division, the Finnish defenders had been reinforced, indeed, but the High Comm. had only sent 1 addit. Regiment (JR-64), a Ski Jäger Bn + 1 Infantry Bn.
As the Finns had managed to stop the 44th, they switched the focus to the 163rd + destroyed its 3 regiments eventually, using the tactics described above. The survivors fled across the lake to the Russian border.
Once the 163rd was destroyed, the 44th experienced the same fate as the 163rd, the Finns surrounded the 44th + cut it into several isolated ("digestable") pieces along the road. Initially, the column of the 44th had dug in along the road, then occupying a 30-km stretch of the road.
Until early January, the road was still accessible from the east, so the 44th was reinforced by the 3rd NKWD Border Guard Rgt. in very late December or during the first days of January.
The Finnish attacks then allowed to establish Finnish road blocks in between the column parts, which created several pockets, and the most eastern road block then denied a retreat to the east/access from the east.
The pockets were then reduced by the Finns. The approaches to the road blocks were mined and covered by MGs. According to Trotter, in "Frozen Hell", Stalin allowed a withdrawal on January 6, but it was too late, as the elements of the Division and the Guard Regiment were trapped in several pockets and unable to organize/muster a large breakout attempt. The last organized resistance ceased around January 7 or January 8.
Only 6 hrs of daylight, the confined Russian perimeters along the road and the rather small town perimeter meant that it was extremely difficult to supply the Soviet troops by air. Supply drops were either aborted or had gotten into Finnish hands. The thick forests offered good protection against the conducted Soviet bomber raids, so air support had proven to be ineffective.
The Finns captured 43 tanks, over 200 trucks and plenty of field guns (70-80) and horses (over 1,100).
Right before the Finns had started their final attacks (January 6?) and before they started to mop up the Russian stragglers that had managed to escape destruction (January 7, 1940) during the following 2 days, the weather conditions had worsened, with local temperatures dropping to -24° or even -28° Celsius on January 3 and January 4, so that the Finns just had to mop up freezing and starving Soviet soldiers during or after their final attacks.
EDIT: The weather on January 4 (purple area near the number 1005):
Quite some of the stragglers who had managed to escape the pockets and the subsequent Finnish patrols by running across the lake then froze to death during the attempt to reach the Russian border. Until January 12, the temperature had moved up to -10° C or even -8°C, so that small groups still managed to reach the border, but they had been chased by Finnish ski troops all along the way.
In case there were still stragglers trying to get to the Russian border on January 14, then they were really unlucky, as they got into a low from the Arctic with temperatures of - 30° Celsius and even below (possibly -35° to -38°C):
Engine Key features needed to accurately render winter combat in Finland/the Sovietunion:
EDIT:
- frozen lakes/rivers
- the frozen lake terrain should be able to inflict losses/casualties (eg. trucks + passengers) when troops are crossing the terrain during thawing periods (not used in this particular Finnish battle, but useful for other theaters, eg. Russia, Hungary, Romania, etc.)
- ice road terrain (giving ski troops a movement bonus)
- ski-movement speed for troops
- inability for badly equipped infantry (no winter clothing, no snow shoes/skis) to move in deep snow (thus being restricted to plowed tracks + roads) or speed reduction to "crawl speed"
- camo clothing (reducing detectability)
- severe weather conditions (e.g. -30° C) creating an X amount of casualties (death from freezing) per hour or day (Stalingrad: -30° C, with negative spikes during snow storms, reportedly even colder than -30° C)
- night attacks (here: continuously used by the Finns, but also used by the Russians during Barbarossa to avoid German artillery barrages)
- malnutrion/illnesses creating an X amount of casualties (also useful for a Pacific DLC, ie. Malaria/other diseases/JAP starvation)
- reduced movement in thick snow (+ Russian mud): narrow tracks vs. wide tracks - all nations, lower mov. speed with narrow tracks + without 4x4 drive, even 0 speed X-country
- thick snow terrain condition/overlay
- EDIT: Dismount feature. German Light tanks, 4x4 vehicles, halftracks and tracked artillery tractors had less trouble during mud season or in thick snow, but regular trucks, passenger cars/Kübelwagen and medium tanks usually got stuck, where then the passengers/crews had to walk/wait until the vehicles could be retrieved. Tank units usually had to wait for the end of the mud season before they could conduct major operations again. The Ostketten improved the situation, but they still didn't have the desired width (that would have involved a redesign of the tank hulls). In contrast, the tracks of the Russian T-34 tanks offered fair/good traction in deep snow/mud.