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[DevBlog] Khalkhyn-Gol DLC SITREP

GoodGuy

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Guys, here's one of the two SITREPs planned (the second one will be published next week).

"I have several candidate battles identified so far, for which I have already collected some preliminary literature, archival documents and maps. I can't tell you who these candidates are, because this would ruin the surprise and also reveal you many potential EF DLCs.

But if you'd like to promote your favourite campaign or even battle, you may let me know in comments. If you happen to name one of my candidates, this would definitely increase their chances to become the next one.

Please also note that I consider Fall Weiß and Winter War to be a part of "East Front" brand, too. Furthermore, some of my 'candidate battles' have happened exactly in September 1939 and in Winter 39/40. So please don't limit your suggestions purely to the Soviet-German war."

1) The Battle of Rostov (1941)
- this included several (preceding) operations:
  • a) the main Soviet defensive operation (to hold Rostov, September 29 - November 16) that even featured a ...
  • b) counterattack on overextended Axis lines which forced the Germans to redirect the 1st Panzer Army to support the Romanian sector against possible subsequent counterattacks, but which then gave the Germans the opportunity to partly encircle the Soviet 18th Army,
  • c) crossing of the Mius (14. Panzer-Division) and subsequent capture of Taganrog, with Gebirgjäger troops also contesting (which led to the Soviet 12th Army's withdrawal) and capturing Stalino,
  • d) the actual German assault on Rostov (3 days, capture on November 21), and ...
  • e) the actual Russian counterattack (part of the Russian offenvise operation November 17 - December 2) from the North (November 27) forcing the Germans to withdraw from Rostov and to the river Mius at Taganrog. The Germans used the Mius as barrier for the Russian thrust, and built up defensive lines and strongholds, which the Germans expanded across the southern front, as they had decided to dig in. This was the 1st major withdrawal of German forces during Barbarossa.

For a DLC, parts of the Russian counterattack (b), the German advance on Rostov (c + d) and the final Russian counteroffensive (e) could be rendered in a "Battle for Rostov" DLC.

The CO of the mentioned 14. PD, Heim, became CO of the XXXXVIII. Panzerkorps (which was attached to the 6th Army in Stalingrad) in November 1942 and was sacked (and expelled from the Wehrmacht) after the German 6th Army had been encircled.
Heim was scapegoated for the failure of the Panzerkorps to contain the Russian push, even though the Germans knew that the EQ of both the Romanian division (Pz 35 t) and the German division (Pz 38 t) was not sufficient to fend off a powerful Russian attack using T-34 tanks. The Korps had 30 operational tanks, its troops had taken shelter in barns and buildings and had been on standby when the Russian attack started. The Romanian tank division suffered 60% losses and retreated behind the Chir river line, with 2 tanks remaining.
 
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GoodGuy

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2) Battle of Suomussalmi December 7 - January 8 (Winter War, 1939/1940)

a) The actual Battle for Suomussalmi (163rd Division):
  • advance on Suomussalmi with delaying Finnish rear guard actions
  • 1 Soviet regiment holding the northern bank of the lake and attacking (south) across the lake
  • 1 regiment advancing NW where it then gets trapped on the road
  • 1 regiment defending the east of the town and the perimeter north of it
b) Battle of Raate Road (January 1 - January 7, 1940, 44th Motor. Rifle Division + NKWD Guard Regiment)

Inferior Finnish forces trap 2 Soviet divisions, basically on 2 roads and inside the town, the only usable roads to and from their goal (the Finnish town of Suomussalmi). Before, the Soviet 163th Division had managed to capture Suomussalmi, as the Finns had only 2 understrength Coys near or at the border. The Finns resorted to delaying and rearguard actions and retreated towards the town. The Finns burned down the town and retreated to the West, across the lake, so that the Soviets could capture the town without a fight, but the burned place did not offer much cover/shelter for the troops/supply trains.
With a share of the Soviet division (1 regiment?) digging in south of Suoussalmi and on its main road leading to the lake, and another regiment guarding the east of the town, the Russians commenced an attack south of the town right across an arm of the frozen lake, but failed to boot the dug in Finnish defenders on the southern bank of the lake.

The remaining regiment was then sent to the NW to capture Puolanka, where the newly arrived (fresh) Finnish Bn (Er.P 16 ) was able to fend off the Russian unit's attack, which was bound to movement on the only available road. That Russian Rgt. could only use the frozen lake as supply "road" to the command post in Suomussalmi. The only remaining supply line (the road to the east) was then cut by Finnish elements, which expanded the road block somewhat to the north, so that the Russians were trapped in the town, with only the (open/flat) lake serving as connecting route to the trapped regiment in the NW.

Since the Russians in the NW were basically trapped on the road (with trucks, heavy EQ, horses, guns, etc.), the Finns then employed a tactic that allowed for cutting the huge line of Russian troops into several isolated sections. For this task, the destruction of the Soviet division, the Finnish Supreme Command had sent Inf Regiment JR-27, so that the size of the Finnish troops (including the mentioned understrength Border Coys and the 16th Bn) in the area then roughly reached Brigade strength.
The 163rd's requests to retreat were turned down by the Russian High Command. Obviously, the High Command was not informed about (or interested in) the local weather conditions and the lack of winter clothing.

The Finns had skis, winter clothing and white camo suits which enabled them to mount numerous gun and run attacks (often at night) and maintain a high level of mobility. The RU had to rest in foxholes, makeshift tents or under vehicles, while the Finns could warm up/rest in heated tents + dugouts.

The Soviet troops lacked winter clothing, camo suits + were mostly bound to the road (+ section of the frozen lake) for movement. 1,600 (?) skis had been loaded on Russian soil, but the troops had never trained on skis so they were not used. On top of that, Finnish troops kept attacking ammo dumps + kitchen/supply detachments, which made Russian supply efforts very difficult.

In turn, the Finnish CO had ordered to build an ice road in the deep snow which was eventually expanded to a whole road (or ski) network in the surrounding woods (partly parallel to the road) early on, just outside the Russian view, which then the Finnish ski troops could use to redeploy quickly + to supply their siege elements. This enabled the Finns to maintain the siege of these multiple pockets, but also caused panic among the Russians, as this created the false impression that they faced superior Finnish forces.

The Soviet 44th Motor. Rifle Division, the elite unit sent to relieve the 163rd, advanced on the Raate road tow. Suomussalmi but decided to dig in along the road, 10-12 km short of the town, because Finnish forces had started to attack the front of the column. The RU then tried to attack the Finnish road block in front of them, but failed to boot the defenders, while the center of their column had to defend the perimeter along the road.

Due to the appearance of the Soviet Rifle Division, the Finnish defenders had been reinforced, indeed, but the High Comm. had only sent 1 addit. Regiment (JR-64), a Ski Jäger Bn + 1 Infantry Bn.

As the Finns had managed to stop the 44th, they switched the focus to the 163rd + destroyed its 3 regiments eventually, using the tactics described above. The survivors fled across the lake to the Russian border.

Once the 163rd was destroyed, the 44th experienced the same fate as the 163rd, the Finns surrounded the 44th + cut it into several isolated ("digestable") pieces along the road. Initially, the column of the 44th had dug in along the road, then occupying a 30-km stretch of the road.
Until early January, the road was still accessible from the east, so the 44th was reinforced by the 3rd NKWD Border Guard Rgt. in very late December or during the first days of January.

The Finnish attacks then allowed to establish Finnish road blocks in between the column parts, which created several pockets, and the most eastern road block then denied a retreat to the east/access from the east.
The pockets were then reduced by the Finns. The approaches to the road blocks were mined and covered by MGs. According to Trotter, in "Frozen Hell", Stalin allowed a withdrawal on January 6, but it was too late, as the elements of the Division and the Guard Regiment were trapped in several pockets and unable to organize/muster a large breakout attempt. The last organized resistance ceased around January 7 or January 8.

Only 6 hrs of daylight, the confined Russian perimeters along the road and the rather small town perimeter meant that it was extremely difficult to supply the Soviet troops by air. Supply drops were either aborted or had gotten into Finnish hands. The thick forests offered good protection against the conducted Soviet bomber raids, so air support had proven to be ineffective.

The Finns captured 43 tanks, over 200 trucks and plenty of field guns (70-80) and horses (over 1,100).

Right before the Finns had started their final attacks (January 6?) and before they started to mop up the Russian stragglers that had managed to escape destruction (January 7, 1940) during the following 2 days, the weather conditions had worsened, with local temperatures dropping to -24° or even -28° Celsius on January 3 and January 4, so that the Finns just had to mop up freezing and starving Soviet soldiers during or after their final attacks.

EDIT: The weather on January 4 (purple area near the number 1005):

NOAA_1_1940010412_2.png



Quite some of the stragglers who had managed to escape the pockets and the subsequent Finnish patrols by running across the lake then froze to death during the attempt to reach the Russian border. Until January 12, the temperature had moved up to -10° C or even -8°C, so that small groups still managed to reach the border, but they had been chased by Finnish ski troops all along the way.

In case there were still stragglers trying to get to the Russian border on January 14, then they were really unlucky, as they got into a low from the Arctic with temperatures of - 30° Celsius and even below (possibly -35° to -38°C):

NOAA_1_1940011418_2.png




Engine Key features needed to accurately render winter combat in Finland/the Sovietunion
:

EDIT:
  • frozen lakes/rivers
  • the frozen lake terrain should be able to inflict losses/casualties (eg. trucks + passengers) when troops are crossing the terrain during thawing periods (not used in this particular Finnish battle, but useful for other theaters, eg. Russia, Hungary, Romania, etc.)
  • ice road terrain (giving ski troops a movement bonus)
  • ski-movement speed for troops
  • inability for badly equipped infantry (no winter clothing, no snow shoes/skis) to move in deep snow (thus being restricted to plowed tracks + roads) or speed reduction to "crawl speed"
  • camo clothing (reducing detectability)
  • severe weather conditions (e.g. -30° C) creating an X amount of casualties (death from freezing) per hour or day (Stalingrad: -30° C, with negative spikes during snow storms, reportedly even colder than -30° C)
  • night attacks (here: continuously used by the Finns, but also used by the Russians during Barbarossa to avoid German artillery barrages)
  • malnutrion/illnesses creating an X amount of casualties (also useful for a Pacific DLC, ie. Malaria/other diseases/JAP starvation)
  • reduced movement in thick snow (+ Russian mud): narrow tracks vs. wide tracks - all nations, lower mov. speed with narrow tracks + without 4x4 drive, even 0 speed X-country
  • thick snow terrain condition/overlay
  • EDIT: Dismount feature. German Light tanks, 4x4 vehicles, halftracks and tracked artillery tractors had less trouble during mud season or in thick snow, but regular trucks, passenger cars/Kübelwagen and medium tanks usually got stuck, where then the passengers/crews had to walk/wait until the vehicles could be retrieved. Tank units usually had to wait for the end of the mud season before they could conduct major operations again. The Ostketten improved the situation, but they still didn't have the desired width (that would have involved a redesign of the tank hulls). In contrast, the tracks of the Russian T-34 tanks offered fair/good traction in deep snow/mud.
 
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GoodGuy

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Ioncore, pls check the feature list above, I edited a few parts.

There is one additional key feature, the character limit didn't allow me to add this to the previous post:

  • severe frost disabling (German) tanks, as the engine oil got too thick, and as the fuel partly froze (at least according to Guderians memoirs covering the supply conditions of and the weather effects on the 2nd Panzer Army on 14.11.1941 during the Battle of Tula).
Background: When the 1st winter kicked in during Barbarossa, the German High Command issued an order to start the tank engines every 30 mins. The coolant was mixed with Monoethylenglykol (products: "Glysantin" - produced since around 1926 by BASF, or "Dixol"), the ratios (water/Glysantin) were defined in Wehrmacht regulations (eg. "Dienstanweisung vom Heereswaffenamt für Kraftfahrzeuge im Winter - Anweisungen für Wartung und Bedienung Nr. D 635/5, Ausgabe 27. August 1942"), so frozen coolant or coolant tubes appeared to be less of a problem where sufficient supplies were availabl., they could also use spiritus/ethanol.
Some tank units were still waiting for their Glysantin and Glasis (see below) allocations when the winter kicked in, in Nov. 1941 (reference: Guderian).
Tank tracks could easily break during periods with severe frost (like in late 1941), the oil in car and truck dampers thickened or even clumped, plenty of batteries failed/did not survive the cold and the crew compartment heating systems in tanks had to be converted to winter mode (by thoroughly installing winter fans, where then a crew member - either the gunner or the commander - had to constantly watch the CO2-meter, as emissions from the smallest leaks in the exhaust system could be pushed into the crew compartment), etc. etc.
Some of these problems had been observed in Germany during manouevres before the war, but the findings had been widely ignored.

During (or after - depending on type of solution) the winter of 1941/42, the Germans tried to counter the effects of severe frost with several measures:

  • The Germans developed "winter oil" and "winter fuel" but the winter oil was only suited for temperatures down to -20 degrees Celsius.
  • They added kerosene to the engine oil to avoid thickenings.
  • They added Diesel fuel to the damper oil.
  • The crews kept fires burning under the oil pans (of trucks and other vehicles) or near the tank tracks (to keep the tracks from freezing).
  • They used blowtorches (used to heat up oil pans, or the filters and pipes of Diesel engines to dissolve paraffin clots), this was explicitly recommended in a field manual from November 1942 ("Taschenbuch fuer den Winterkrieg"): "Anwärmen des Motorengehäuses mit der Loetlampe (mit und ohne Aufsatz) und mit offenem Feuer. Zum Feuern wird Holzkohle oder Kraftstoff in Konservendosen verwandt. Beim Anwärmen sind Gummiteile, das Schauglas der Kraftstoffpumpe und der leicht undicht werdende Kühler vor der Flamme zu schützen. Grundsätzlich beobachtet ein Mann das Feuer."
  • the development of start couplings ("Anwerfergetriebe Typ 198 für KfZ-Motoren", I am not sure when it became available) enabled the Germans to say use a Kübelwagen to start a Panther's or heavy tank's engine later on, heavy Krads could be used to start truck engines.
  • external fixed/portable motor fuel engines specifically designed to start tanks (and issued to units in 1944/1945, during 2 comparatively mild winters :D )
  • application of "Glasis" (a gel that avoided fogging of lenses, available in 1941 - well in theory) on (tank/gun) optics.
  • built-in heating units in Tiger/Panther tanks that could warm up batteries and parts of the engines (starter, water lines, oil pan, etc.)
  • external cooling systems (eg. the systems of warmed up tanks or halftracks) could be used to warm up other tanks. When a cooling system contained a sufficient amount of Glysantin/Dixol, cooling water could not freeze but it could still get into a gelatinous state during severe frost. While this would still avoid an engine (frost/ice) blow-out, it would actually hamper/block coolant circulation to an extent that engines could overheat quickly. I am not sure when the heating system nozzles had been introduced, and I am not sure if Pz. III and Pz IV ever received those nozzles.
  • tank units had external coolant heaters at their disposal, which could maintain a proper temperature for one night, they could also use large hot-air fans (not sure when they were introduced, heaters and fans must have been available in November 1942, at least - see link below).
  • The engines of German and Russian aircraft suffered of similar problems, which were fixed by employing some of the methods above.
  • EDIT: Later on, it was commonly known among Army armorers and Luftwaffe aircraft wardens that gun oil and grease in MG 34 and similar MGs had to be removed during winter to avoid jamming. I am assuming that this was widely known by late 1942. According to the German fighter ace Erich Hartmann (in "Holt Hartmann vom Himmel" by Raymond F. Olivier und Trevor J. Constable, co-author: Erich Hartmann), a captured Russian pilot told him that the Russians removed oil/grease by putting their aircraft MGs in a barrel of hot water, because cleaned guns remained operational at temperatures down to -40° Celsius. Since Hartmann had finished pilot training in September or October 1942 and since he was then deployed to the EF in October '42, I am guessing that he learned about this method the same year (I don't own the book). I am not sure how reliable his account is, because German planes had operated at medium and somewhat higher altitudes for years already, and such flight levels featured low(est) temperatures that would have jammed aircraft MGs already. It's hard to believe that German armorers/wardens in 1941 didn't know that degreasing could avoid/reduce frost jamming, I wouldn't rule it out, though. Page 92: "Der Russe nahm ein deutsches MG und tunkte es in ein Fass kochendes Wasser, dabei spülte er alles Fett aus der Waffe. Ohne die vorgeschriebenen Schmiermittel funktionierte das MG einwandfrei bei Temperaturen von 40 Grad unter Null. Dank diesem russischen Tip, waren die Deutschen in der Lage nicht nur zu fliegen, sondern auch zu schießen."

  • The T-34 was less prone to severe cold, as it had a pneumatic starting system, but thickened oil may have been a common problem in Russian motorized/tracked units, too (subject to research). There are plenty of accounts of interrogated Russian POWs who reported that they maintained small fires under the oil pans of Russian trucks, for instance.

https://de.wikiversity.org/wiki/Dir...dingungen_(1942)#Sto.C3.9Fd.C3.A4mpfer.C3.B6l

Relevance for wargames:
the makeshift measures which had to be used in winter 1941 in Russia increased the time needed to get going. For instance, warming up a tank's "innerds" with blowtorches took around 30 minutes (according to veterans) but could also take several hours - depending on weather conditions and on the level of protection (were external heaters and/or shelters/barns available in the field or were the tanks just sheeted outside without any heating?, etc.), this has to be factored in for a historically correct depiction of the ....
  • decampment/deployment times of tank units between 1939 and 1941.
 
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