

Control Measure	Graphic	Example	
riendly Direction of Decisive Operations riendly Direction of Main Attack	-	1₫4—	Direction of Attack – (DOD) A specific direction or route that the main attack or center of mass of the unit will follow. The unit is restricted, required to attack as indicated, and is not normally allowed to bypass the enemy.  The direction of attack is used primarily in counterattacks or to ensure that supporting attacks make maximal contribution to the main attack. (Army) A specific direction or assigned route a force uses and does not deviate from when attacking.
riendly Direction f Shaping perations riendly Direction f Supporting	$\longrightarrow$	3 28	Attack – (Army) An offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both. (FM 3-0) (Marine Corps) An offensive action characterized by movement supported by fire with the objective of defeating or destroying the enemy. See also FM 1-02/MCRP 5-12A1-16
riendly Direction f Attack Planned r On Order	>	3 187	Support – (DOD)  1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action.
riendly Ground xis of Shaping perations riendly Ground xis of Supporting ttack	$\rightarrow$	1 × 45	<ul><li>2. A unit which helps another unit in battle.</li><li>3. An element of a command which assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. See FM 101-5.</li></ul>
riendly Ground axis of Decisive Operations riendly Ground axis of Main Attack		2 N	Axis of Advance – (DOD) A line of advance assigned for purposes of control; often a road or a group of roads, or a designated series of locations, extending in the direction of the enemy.  (Army) An axis of advance designates the general area through which the bulk of a unit's combat power must move.
riendly Ground axis On Order with Date and Time (if nown) Effective	NAME EFF W	GOLD EFF 210730MAY	On-Order Mission – A mission to be executed at an unspecified time in the future. A unit with an on-order mission is a committed force. The commander envisions task execution in the concept of operations; however, he may not know the exact time or place of execution. Subordinate commanders develop plans and orders and allocate resources, task-organize, and position forces for execution. See also beprepared mission. (FM 101-5)
Follow and Assume. (See page 1-82 for d	efinition.)	<u> </u>	Follow and Assume – (Army) A tactical mission task in which a second committed force follows a force conducting an offensive operation and is prepared to continue the mission if the lead force is fixed, attrited, or unable to continue. (FM 3-90)
Follow and Support. (See page 1-82 for d	efinition.)	<u></u>	Follow and Support – A tactical mission task in which a committed force follows and supports a lead force conducting an offensive operation. (FM 3-90)
Moving Convoy	VAC	M1A2 111 5 120730ZFEB03	Convoy – A group of vehicles organized for the purpose of control and orderly movement with or without escort protection that moves over the same route at the same time under one commander.
Attack by Fire	<b>^</b>	<b>^</b>	Attack by Fire Position – A position that designates the general position from which a unit conducts the tactical mission task of attack by fire. See also attack by fire. (FM 3-90)
Position. See page 1-16 for definition.)	NAME	OAK	Attack by Fire – A tactical mission task in which a commander uses direct fires, supported by indirect fires, to engage an enemy without closing with him to destroy, suppress, fix, or deceive him. See also frontal attack; support by fire. (FM 3-90)
Support by Fire Position. See page 1-179 or definition.)	NAME	MAPLE	Support by fire – A tactical mission task in which a maneuver force moves to a position where it can engage the enemy by direct fire in support of another maneuvering force. (FM 3-90)
Block. (See page 1-23 for definition.)		в	Block – 1. A tactical mission task that denies the enemy access to an area or prevents his advance in a direction or along an avenue of approach. 2. An obstacle effect that integrates fire planning and obstacle effort to stop an attacker along a specific avenue of approach or to prevent him from passing through an engagement area. (FM 3-90)
			Bocking position – (DOD, NATO) A defensive position so sited as to deny the enemy access to a given area or to prevent the enemy's advance in a given direction. See FM 3-90.
Retain. (See page 1-163 for	definition.)	**************************************	Retain – (DOD)  1. When used in the context of deliberate planning, the directed command will keep the referenced operation plan, operation plan in concept format, and any associated joint operation planning system of Joint Operation Planning and Execution System automated data processing files in an inactive library status. The plan and its associated files will not be maintained unless directed by follow-on guidance.  2. A tactical task to occupy and hold a terrain feature to ensure that it is free of enemy occupation or use.  (Army) A tactical mission task in which the commander ensures that a terrain feature already controlled by a friendly force remains free of enemy occupation or use. (FM 3-90)


### TABLE XIII. Color range values for filled symbols.

	HAND DRAWN	COMPUTER GENERATED		
DESCRIPTION		DARK	MEDIUM	LIGHT
Hostile, Suspect, Joker, Faker	Red	RGB (200, 0, 0) HSL (0, 255, 100)	RGB (255, 48, 49) HSL (0, 255, 152)	RGB (255, 128, 128) HSL (0, 255, 192)
Friend, Assumed Friend	Blue	RGB (0, 107, 140) HSL (138, 255, 70)	RGB (0, 168, 220) HSL (138, 255, 110)	RGB (128, 224, 255) HSL (138, 255, 192)

Control Measure	Graphic	Example	Position Area for Artillery – An area
Position Area for Artillery (PAA). See page 1-148 or definition.)	PAA PAA	PAA PAA	assigned to an artillery unit where individual artillery systems can maneuver to increase their survivability. A position area for artillery is not an area of operations for the artillery unit occupying it. Also called PAA. (FM 3-90)
Friendly Forces	page 1-70 for definition.)	308	Encirclement – (Army) An operation where one force loses its freedom of maneuver because an opposing force is able to isolate it by controlling all ground lines of communications. (FM 3-0) (Marine Corps) The loss of freedom of maneuver resulting from enemy control of all ground routes of evacuation and reinforcement.
Hostile Forces Encircled		<eny eny=""></eny>	Encircling Force – (Army/Marine Corps) In pursuit operations, the force which maneuvers to the rear or flank of the enemy to block his escape so that he can be destroyed between the direct pressure force and encircling force. This force advances or flies along routes parallel to the enemy's line of retreat. If the encircling force cannot outdistance the enemy to cut him off, the encircling force may also attack the flank of
Control Measure	Graphic	Example	a retreating enemy. See FM 3-90.  Division Support Area – An area normally
vivision Support rea (DSA). See page 1-85 for efinition.)	DSA	DSA	located in the division rear and often positioned near air-landing facilities along the main supply route.  The division support area contains the portions of the division rear command post, division support command (DISCOM) command post, and units organic and attached to the DISCOM. It may also contain the corps support command units supporting the division and non divisional units in the division area. Also called DSA. (FM 63-2)
rigade Support rea (BSA). See page 1-25 for efinition.)	BSA	BSA	Brigade Support Area – A designated area in which combat service support elements from division support command and corps support command provide logistic support to a brigade. Also called BSA. (FM 7-30)

Fortified Area	5	5 5 5	
Friendly Strong Point (SP). (See page 1-178 for definition.)	LETTER, NUMBER OR NAME	ALPHA L	Strong Point – (DOD, NATO) A key point in a defensive position, usually strongly fortified and heavily armed with automatic weapons, around which other positions are grouped for its protection. (Army) A heavily fortified battle position tied to a natural or reinforcing obstacle to create an anchor for the defense or to deny the enemy decisive or key terrain. Also called SP. See also battle position; mobile defense. (FM 3-90) (See page 7-25 for symbols.)
Battle Position (BP)	(See page 1-21 for definition.)		
Occupied  Note: The side oppor	Site Field B (Echelon) faces toward the hos	GREEN II	Battle Position – (Army) 1. A defensive location oriented on a likely enemy avenue of approach. (FM 3-90)  2. For attack helicopters, an area designated in which they can maneuver and fire into a designated engagement area or engage targets of opportunity. (FM 1-112) (Marine Corps) 1. In ground operations, a defensive location oriented on an enemy avenue of approach from which a unit may defend. 2. In air operations, an airspace coordination area containing fire points for attack helicopters. Also
Prepared but not Occupied	(P) LETTER, NUMBER OR NAME	(P) GREEN	called BP.
Planned	LETTER, NUMBER OR NAME	GREEN	
Bridge or Gap Crossing		***************************************	

Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT). (See page 1-85 for definition.) Friendly Present	~~~	- x - S - FLOT	Forward Line of Own Troops – (DOD) A line which indicates the most forward positions of friendly forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time. The forward line of own troops (FLOT) normally identifies the forward location of covering and screening forces. The FLOT may be at, beyond, or short of the forward edge of the battle area. An enemy FLOT indicates the forward-most position of hostile forces. Also called FLOT. See FM 3-90.
Line of Contact (LC). (See page 1-113 for definition.)	— II — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —	ENY C D C D ENY T	Line of Contact – A general trace delineating the locations where friendly and enemy forces are engaged.  [Note: the Marine Corps definition replaces "friendly and enemy forces" with "two opposing forces."] Also called LC. See also forward edge of the battle area; forward line of own troops; line of departure; line of departure is line of contact. (FM 3-90)
Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA). (See page 1-85 for definition.)	FEBA S FEBA	FEBA FEBA  Actual Trace  FEBA  Proposed or On Order	Forward Edge of the Battle Area – (DOD, NATO) The foremost limits of a series of areas in which ground combat units are deployed, excluding the areas in which the covering or screening forces are operating, designated to coordinate fire support, the positioning of forces, or the maneuver of units. Also called FEBA. See also main battle area. See FM 3-90.  Main Battle Area – (DOD) That portion of the battlefield in which the decisive battle is fought to defeat the enemy. For any particular command, the main battle area extends rearward from the forward edge of the battle area to the rear boundary of the command's subordinate units. (Army) The area where the commander intends to deploy the bulk of his combat power and conduct his decisive operations to defeat an attacking enemy. Also called MBA.
Limit of Advance (LOA). (See page 1-112 for definition.)	LOA LOA	PL GLASS  FL GLA	Limit of Advance – (Army) A phase line used to control forward progress of the attack. The attacking unit does not advance any of its elements or assets beyond the limit of advance, but the attacking unit can push its security forces to that limit. (FM 3-90) (Marine Corps) An easily recognized terrain feature beyond which attacking elements will not advance. Also called LOA. See also final coordination line; probable line of deployment.
Line of Departure (LD). (See page 1-113 for definition.)	LD LD	PL PAPER  B2  3AD XX 1CD 1CD XX ABN  DIV	Line of Departure – (DOD, NATO) 1. In land warfare, a line designated to coordinate the departure of attack elements. 2. (Army) A phase line crossed at a prescribed time by troops initiating an offensive operation. Also called LD. See also line of contact; line of departure is line of contact. (FM 3-90)
Main Supply Route (MSR).	MSR NAME	MSR HAIL	Main Supply Route – (DOD, NATO) The route or routes designated within an operational area upon which the bulk of traffic flows in support of military operations. Also called MSR. See FM 4-01.30.





3 Para have secured the vital rail bridge at Oosterbeek, and are forming in all round defense in the Polder, North of the bridge.



Situation in Nijmegen D1, 18:56

1st and 2nd Battalions of the 508 make steady progress towards the South end of the highway bridge in Nijmegen.

1st Battalion are in left echelon formation to protect the flank of the main effort by 2nd Battalion , who are in successive line formation.

C and E Coy's are resting in reserve after their speed march over the Heights, having successfully completed their important task, to scout ahead of the main force, and ensure a secure FUP.

C Bty 80 Abn AT Bn, have also been ordered to accompany the small force to provide Anti Tank support.

They are equipped with eight

I don't intend to have any of the force attempt to cross the bridge to secure the objective on the other side.

Instead they will hold a small, tenuous bridgehead in Nijmegen.

I may send one of the Battalions back to the Heights once the bridge has been reached.

I am, as yet, undecided on that course of action however.

It will depend on the build up of enemy between now, and when the bridgehead is









## Groesbeek Heights.

The morning light revealed a Divisions worth of mixed Axis units, attacking the DZ's and the Heights from the south east.

The 505, plus 3 Bn of the 508 are critically under manned to repel this size of force.

They have numerous field artillery, 📝 and most feared of all by our infantry the dreaded four-barreled 20mm Flakvierling AAA, pressed into service in the direct fire role.

There are numerous gaps in the line to the front and the rear, with the units spread out to far for mutual support.

Come evening it will be easily possible for the enemy to infiltrate between these positions.


I have a plan though. Come last light all the infantry on the Heights will be placed under command of the 505 Regt HQ, and 🥞 ordered to fix bayonets.

At precisely 20:00hrs they will assault down hill in an attempt to clear the DZ's before the objective expires at 23:00hrs.

My well trained men will be no match for the poorly trained, and scratch units of our enemy, as they Park steam roll down the hill in the dead of night.

I hope!





This was a highly effective combination of the four-barrelled 20mm Flakvierling gun on an SdKfz 7 half-track. As well flak defence it provided terrifying firepower in the direct fire role. 319 were built until October 1944.









Sitrep D2, 21:20

Battle of DZ T 1 hour 40 min till objective expiration.

The elite Paratroops make steady progress, across the open hillside, down towards the concentration of enemy units.

The crashing, and thud of the falling rounds, masks the sound of their approach, and the darkness, smoke, and debris, obscures them from sight.

The enemy have clumped up here, probably for mutual support in the dark, and a concentration of firepower, but its left them vulnerable to artillery

A creeping barrage from four Battalions of 105mm artillery, and two sections of 81mm mortar fire pave their way.

The artillery observer, specially appointed by General Daz, has made a detailed fire plan for this important attack.

He accompanies the lead Coy HQ commanders Group as they follow the point Platoon, reporting back on the radio to Corps HQ as the troops cross the phase lines, in order for the barrage to be moved onto the next phase.

E Coy 505 PIR have made first contact with the enemy.

The clock is ticking. All the Coy commanders have been briefed on their task, and told not to

briefed on their task, and told not to wait for other units, but to plow on regardless of formation or casualties.

The DZ must be cleared...and quickly.







Night
Clear skies
Temp: 16c
Ground: Normal
Visibility: 3000m

Sunrise: 06:00 Sunset: 19:00 Clear Pattern Min Temp: 12c Max Temp: 20c

Sitrep D2, 21:31 Battle of DZ T

1 hour 29 min till objective expiration.

The lead Coy's are pushing hard, and the enemy front is beginning to crumble.

G Coy 508 on the left flank, in left echelon formation is taking casualties, and faltering.

I have ordered the C Coy 307 Airborne Engineer Bn to shore up the left flank.

This will leave the Heights vulnerable.

Lets hope our enemy are to distracted with our counter attack to notice!

F Coy 505 and H Coy 508 are on their way to join the battle having managed to disengage from their scrap with 2 SS Pz Gren Coy KG Euling, leaving it badly mauled.









### Sitrep D2, 22:16

### Battle of DZ T 44 min till objective expiration.

Our men continue to gain ground at a steady rate, as the enemy fall back under the pressure of the well trained, and fit Paratroopers, aswell asthe well timed, and placed artillery barrage.

D Coy 505 on the right flank have reached their objective in the light woods near the edge of the DZ, and deployed into all round defense. They are continuing to pour fire onto the nearby enemy units.

Unfortunately a small unit has managed to slip through our ranks in the dark, and confusion of battle.

I have sent a runner to C Coy 307
Airborne Engineer Bn, to order
them to seek and destroy it. Unfortunately it will take 48 min for the
runner to get there, and the Coy
Commander to swing his Coy to the
right, with his new orders.

I am beginning to suspect the battle may be lost, unless we can cause enough casualties to have a 10:1 ratio of friendly to enemy forces inside the objective, within the next 44 min.

On a good note the remaining men of 2 SS Pz Gren Coy KG Euling, have been destroyed, by the sentries guarding the 508 Retg Base.

There is still much to do, and very little time to do it.





# Sitrep D2, 22:46 Battle of DZ T 14 min till objective expiration.

C Coy 307 Airborne Engineer Bn have recieved their new orders, and are heading for the center of the objective in line formation.

I'm not sure where the weak enemy unit that slipped through the assault have gone exactly.

The sighting is no longer current. If they have gone to within 300m of the center of the objective though, we won't get completion even if we have a 10:1 superiority of force, so I have sent the Engineers to the middle to ensure it stays clear.


I and G Coy 508 have started to receive murderous fire from the heavy weapons of the powerful Flak Bn, and have pulled back having sustained very heavy casualties in a very short period of time.

The bulk of the enemy units have been forced out of the objective perimeter, with just a few remaining on the outskirts.

One last push and I think we may just make it!







### Sitrep D3, 12.15

### Tasking of Grenadier Guards

The first reinforcements to arrive on the map in the morning of Day three are the Grenadier Guards.

They have been ordered to work closely with the 82nd Airborne, to shore up their defenses on the Groesbeek Heights.

Their first objective is to re-take the Rienthorst Objective, then 1st Bn will be sent up onto the heights to reinforce the area of the Kliene Vlierenberg Objective.
















resistance coming from a Pz Recon Coy, and an HQ in the north, with their backs to the river. As benign as the HQ looks, it actually has three king Tiger tanks in it! A platoon of 17 pdr AT guns, and a platoon of Achilles Mk IC - 17 pdr SP guns, have been brought forward from the Coldstream Guards Group HQ, as they are equipped to deal with the Tigers. The secret to defeating them though is to get as close as possible, but they have


- 1 Coldsream Guards Bn met very light resistance on the left flank as they moved through the factories to the position they now occupy, with a clear view of the rail bridge
- 7 Green Howard's were ordered to halt their attack early, as they had become exhausted, having shared the brunt of the fighting all night. They have been ordered in to all round defense, with allow attacks, and the Bn commander has sent D coy to attack a badly mauled SS unit just south of the rail bridge.
- 5 Coldstream guards have reached the rail bridge, and I have placed the whole Bn into defend in situ as the Bn HQ got tangled up with an enemy unit on its way to join them.


Noticing that the north bank of the











This is one of the most complex attacks, for a single objective, I have put together in Command Ops to date.

It involves five formations in the attack, and another four providing covering fire.


Two Medium Regiments of Artillery will provide a creeping barrage, while, another two Regiments split into six individual Batteries, of SP Artillery provide on call support.

The numerous mortars, and some of the SP Arty will be handled by the AI, and left attached to the Bn HQ's.

I have managed to get the command delay down to a

reasonable level, XXX Corps HQ for the attack, by re-connecting units elsewhere on the map back to their organic HQ's so that I can concentrate on this important battle.

1 Coldstream Guards Bn, on the left flank, are to provide covering fire from the fac-



tories overlooking the area of Fort Von Holland, to the West of the Rail bridge.

5 Coldstream Guards, at the head of the Rail Bridge, are to provide covering fire onto the area

🗕 🖼 1 Coldstream Gds Bn HQ 🚾 G Tp 94 LAA Regt 🖃 B Sgn 1 Coldstream Gds - 🖾 A Coy 5 Coldstream Gds 🖃 Recce Tp 1 Coldstream Gds

💌 C Coy 5 Coldstream Gds

Mor PI 5 Coldstream Gds 🖃 C Sgn 1 Coldstream Gds

🖶 🖾 D Coy 5 Coldstream Gds

- H Tp 94 LAA Regt 🔫 B Coy 5 Coldstream Gds

of the rail bridge exit, and onto the Recon units still occupying a small portion of the north west corner of the City Centre.

7 Green How-😑 💌 5 Coldstream Gds Bn HQ ard'sis are attacking the enemy Recon unit, and HQ trapped in the north west corner. This is to destroy the enemy, but also to occupy

the bank of the river, where they can provide covering

= 💌 7 Green Howards Inf Bn HQ assaults across the C Tp 25 LAA Regt bridges. — 🐼 C Tp 102 AT Reqt This attack has Mor PI 7 Green Howards been co-ordinat-🗕 🖾 A Coy 7 Green Howards ed to start at the same time as the C Coy 7 Green Howard: two bridge cross-Coy 7 Green Howard ings.

The armored elements of the 13/18 Hussars, have been tasked to cross the rail bridge, and exploit as far as Lent.


🖃 🖼 13/18 Hussars HQ B Bty 147 Fd Regt 🗕 🖃 A Sgn 13/18 Hussars 🔲 🖪 B Sgn 13/18 Hussars C Sgn 13/18 Hussars




























### Sitrep D5, 11:48 Encircling of Arnhem

The encircling of Arnhem has begun with the 2nd Welsh Guards Bn, striking out east from 4th Para Brigade's secured sector, then passing through the suburb of Galgen, priorly reconnoitered by A Squadron 43 Recce Regt, to sever the main, north south, highway. B Coy lost a number of their tanks to an enemy HQ unit with an embedded platoon of Stug III's.

1st Welsh Guards Bn were supposed to support them for this maneuver, but got held up by a retreating enemy SP Artillery Coy.

They are currently in convoy heading to the Assembly area, but have been held up yet again just north of the Railway Bridge by an infiltrating enemy infantry Bn.

The Irish Guards Brigade, have managed to catch them up, and the two convoys have become intertwined.

Just to add to the confusion 10 Para Bn, who were in reserve for this sector, have just started their task of clearing the area, of the enemy Infantry Bn that managed to infiltrate our perimeter last night.


The enemy rear guard was spotted at first light this morning, revealing the gap in our perimeter, Just south of D Squadron Glider Pilot Regiment, and C Coy 1st Border Bn has been rushed in to seal it, thus sealing the enemy inside our perimeter. (See inset left)

Evidently D Squadron were able to deny the infiltration lane to the enemy during daylight, but come dark, they were no longer able to cover it through the dense woods.

Once the 1st Bn of the Welsh Guards, and the Irish Guards arrive at their assembly areas, plans will be made to continue the encirclement to the east, around Arnhem.

It is hoped that the enemy will leave their fortified positions in the City in order to attack our encirclement in order to restore their main supply routes.

This will hopefully weaken them, and then a full scale co-ordinated counter attack can begin, to reduce the Arnhem pocket.





Their secondary task is to support by fire an attempt by two Sqn's of 13/18 Hussars to cross the Hwy Bridge into the City.

B Sqn NY is to peel of to the small industrial area to the left first, then B Sqn 13/18 Husars will stop at the first zone along the main line of

A and C Sqn's will then stop at the next, largest, and C Coy 12th KRRC are to continue to the last.

P 13/18 Hussars HQ B Bty 147 Fd Regt A Sqn 13/18 Hussars C Sqn 13/18 Hussars

with the objective of crossing the Hwy bridge to form a small bridgehead on the other side.

13/18 Hussars are to conduct the main attack A Coy 12<sup>th</sup> KRRC, with the Recce Troop in

🕶 A Coy 12th KRRC Recce Tp 13/18 Hussars

support, will lead the way for the first part,to clear the road of infantry, and AT guns in the dark.

assume control of the main attack, come daybreak.

4/7 Royal Dragoon Guards will strike out

4/7 Royal Dragoon Guards HQ 💳 🕳 A San 4/7 RDG 🔙 🕳 C San 4/7 RDG

fire.

The main body of Armour is to follow and will north east to clear the area of the encircled enemy units, and take some of the pressure of the main attack, by drawing direct and indirect

B Coy 12<sup>th</sup> KRRC, have been ordered to de-

🕶 B Coy 12th KRRC

fend in Elden.

Recce TP NY, and Recce TP 4/7 RDG are to

Recce Tp Notts Yeomanry 👛 Recce Tp 4/7 RDG

screen the right flank, starting with an attack to disrupt an enemy MG unit that has got to close to the RDG Assault Position

5<sup>th</sup> Wiltshires Inf Batallion are also screening the right flank, and have been tasked to secure an industrial complex alongside the river, and occupy an orchard at the road junction.

1st Para Brigade, will start a supporting attack along the north bank of the river, supported by fire from the Nottinhamshire Yeomanry once they have secured their positions, and hopefully link up with the main attack from 13/18 Hussars at the north end of the Hwy Bridge.

The 4th Dorsets Infantry Battalion and the 7th Hampshire's, of the 130th Infantry Brigade, are to retain control of the industrial buildings either side of the bridge over the Ijssel and get





# Sitrep D6, 06:42 Expanding the left Flank.

Due to a developing situation north of the Neder Rijn, where a Battalion sized enemy force is attempting to penetrate the 1st Para Div perimeter, I have decided to move 7 Somerset Light Infantry (7 SLI) out to a position where they can provide support by fire to C Coy 1st Border Bn, defending on the north bank.

The mortar platoon of 7 SLI will be particularly useful here to provide indirect fire support for the defense of the 1 Borders Position.

This move will however leave 7 SLI exposed on the line of the left (west) flank so I have decide to move the whole flank out.

I think this is a good move anyway as it will shorten the defensive line as the distance between the rivers is narrower at this point.

I have also decided to move the 504 PIR out so they can support A Coy 5th Duke of Yorks from the south bank of the Waal.

2nd Bn 504 PIR have orders to secure the two railway bridges at Ravenstien, with the engineers from A Coy 307 AB Eng Bn.

1st Bn 504 PIR will remain as Corps Reserve

This maneuvering has left the On Map Boss grossly overloaded, but it should only be for a few hours, as long as the moves go smoothly.

Sorry about the lack of tactical graphics for this one. I'm afraid I'm getting a bit lazy.

Hopefully I will get the inspiration to Finnish it before the end of the scenario.

At least it has given you a good view of the battlefield that I have not paid much attention to in my AAR's For a while.



D.C. T.A.Z.DDC		C 4/7.00C	-		C 4/7 DDC	The state of	
B Sqn 4/7 RDG		A San 4/7 RDG			C Sqn 4/7 RDG		
Assaulting Movino		lalted	Firing		ssaulting	Moving	
→ M4 Sheman - 75mm	10	M4 Sheman -		10	M4 Sherman		10
Sherman Firefly VC	5	Sherman Fireft	y VC	3	Sherman Fin	efly VC	4
111 75mm Tank AP	483	111 75mm Tank A	P.	458	111 75mm Tank	AP	462
111 75mm Tank HE	299	111 75mm Tank H	E	213	111 75mm Tank	HE	176
111 .30 cal	48735	111 .30 cal		46888	111 .30 cal	4	2061
111 .50 cal	20333	111 .50 cal		17605	111 .50 cal	1	7434
111 17 pdr AP	125	111 17 pdr AP		115	111 17 pdr AP		127
11 17 pdr HE	53	111 17 pdr HE		65	111 17 pdr HE		30
□-■ Basics	324	□-■ Basics		252	□-■ Basics		254
■ Fuel	8700	■ Fuel		8680	■ Fuel		8874
This has two Squadrons forward to provide immediate fire on contact or to flank the enemy.			The Squadron commander, designates one of the forward platoons as the base platoon.  The platoons are in line formation, with three Sharman M4 75mm up front, and a Sherman Firefly with its superior gup to the recer.				
It also has one Squadron in the rear.  The Squadrons are also in Vee Formation, with two Platoons forward, and one to the rear.							
The Squadron Commander is usually situated in the center of the formation.							
This Squadron either overwatch, or trail the lead Squadron's.							
This overwatch is incredicted Polder, as one Squadron of ditch or the narrow cause ing the fields while the otle cover.	an negotiate way's conne	e the ct-		V			

A Sherman Firefly tank of the Irish Guards Group advances past Sherman tanks knocked out earlier during Operation 'Market-Garden'.

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Image © 2014 Aerodata International Surveys





On the second day of the Battle of Arnhem, during the Operation Market Garden, Paras from HQ Troop, 1st Airlanding Brigade Recce Squadron, set up defensive positions near the railway s tation at Wolfheze, outskirts of Arnhem, Holland. 18 September 1944

Sitrep D6, 09:01

to aim at a soft spot.


attack earlier.

Jungle.





Halted		Taking Cover
Personnel	0	
Equipment	<b>6</b>	
Morale	0	
Cohesion	0	
Fatigue Suppression	0	
Experience	6	
Training	(C)	No. of Concession, Name of Street, or other Persons, Name of Street, Name of S
Fitness	0	MH. — —
Aggression	0	
Stubborn	0.	
Personnel	99	
Guns	3	
Anti-Persnl	40	1
Anti-Armour	8	
Inf Val	88	
Movement	20	TAS SE
Terrain	City	
Role		ALC: NO
🗻 .303 inch	Lee Enfie	ld 66
★ 9mm Ste	28	
∴ 303 inch     ∴ 303 inch	Bren	10
∡ 2in morta		3
→ PIAT		4
		0
	Vickers	Tall I
.303		10233
111 9mm		4411
111 2in HE		360
III PIAT AP		32
PIAT HE		4
□.■ Basics		471



Halted		Firing		
Personnel	6			-
Equipment	0			
Morale	0	_		
Cohesion	0			
Fatigue	0			106
Suppression	0			100 100 100
Experience Training	6			
Fitness	6	- 3350		
	0			
Aggression Stubborn	6			18
Personnel	80	(A) (A) (B)	OF THE STREET	
Guns				
	3			
Anti-Persnl	33	14		
Anti-Amour	27	7		
Inf Val	73			
Movement	20			
Terrain				ì
	Left Guard		-	
7	-	-		
\star .303 inch		d	49	
Smm Sten      Sten      Smm Sten			25	
🛪 .303 inch Bren			9	
∠ 2in mortar			1	
★ PIAT			4	
			1	
🏕 6 pdr AT gun			2	
.303	1.180111011	1	 0699	
111 3mm			3892	
THE RESIDENCE OF THE PARTY OF T				

203

111 2in HE III PIAT AP

III PIAT HE

6 pdr AP


6 pdr HE


□-■ Basics

R Coy 1 Para Bn	
Halted Deplo	oyed
Personnel 🧵	
Equipment 🤊	
Morale S	- 0
Cohesion 🗺 💮 💮	
Suppression 5	o
Experience	- 0
Training 5	- 0
Fitness 😉	0
Aggression 5	- 0
Stubbom 2	2
Personnel 106	
Guns 3	
Asia Parad 10	
Anti-Amour 6	
Inf Val 94	
Movement 20 👗	
Terrain City	
Role Left Guard	
📩 .303 inch Lee Enfield	74
🗩 9mm Sten	28
🛪 .303 inch Bren	10
∡ 2in mortar	3
★ PIAT	3
😞 .303 inch Vickers	1
	11528
111 9mm	5299
111 2in HE	374
III PIAT AP	26
III PIAT HE	6
- Decise	C1C













Sitrep D6, 16:01 Same time as last Sitrep.

#### The Northern Perimeter

1 Airbourne Recce Squadron, and E

Trp 2 AL AT Bty, have been doing an amazing job on the Northern perimeter since day one.

See mini map above for geographic loca-

Situated on the edge of the woods, with superb arcs of fire overlooking the open terrain to their north, they have been responsible for many stalled attacks, and countless enemy casualties.


With the 38 Armored Jeeps, now entrenched, mounting, twin Vickers K guns, often augmented with the deadly accurate Bren, this unit mounts some serious medium range, anti-personnel firepower!

Being co-located with the four 6 pdr AT Guns from E Trp, is just icing on the cake.

1 Airborne Recce Sqn

■ Fuel







# Sitrep D6, 20:01

2 Hours since last Sitrep.

## Divide and Conquer

The silver crosses are starting to stack up in the City Center, as our enemy takes a major beating.

The light is failing in the besieged City of Arnhem, but I have no intention of letting up on the attack.

Nottinghamshire Yeomanry attack has almost reached its objective and split the City into two smaller pockets.

Progress for them has been slower than predicted due to a single stubborn StuG IIIG on their right.

There has been no sign of the Tigers for several hours.

4/7 Royal Dragoon Guards, have been



filtering in behind them ,to guard the right flank of their advance.

7 KOSB, and 2 Para, have reached their objectives just to the west of the main highway dividing the City.

7 KOSB Bn have been given another attack order to help the Poles reduce the western pocket, but 2 Para have been ordered to defend in situ.

1 Para Bde reserve, 1 Para Bn, will continue the push, and 2 Para will be placed in reserve.

I an trying to rotate 1 Para Bde's Battalions as they have been fighting all day, and are becoming tired.

With the failing light I am also having to start planning for the night offensive on the eastern side of the City by 130 Inf Brigade, and the Coldstream Guards.





Sitrep D6, 23:01
1 Hours since last Sitrep.

## No Easy Way Out

The Tigers have been spotted again trying to make an escape via the highway bridge over the Ijssel.

D Tp 59 AT Regt with just a single 17 pdr gun entrenched in the factory units near the bridge managed to take out two more of the metal beasts before the remaining three skulked of towards the bridge.











