Hi,
Lets also find a way to model the different command and control abilities between the Germans and their allies in 1941. As an example it is extremely unlikely that Romanian/Italian/Hungarian artillery would be able to support a German formation in any time soon (if at all) enough to be of use given the command chains involved. I'm not sure that massive orders delays for axis minors would work either as that might affect the on map bosses overall delay. Not sure though.
The command chains weren't the problem. Erich von Manstein emphasized in his memoirs (Kapitel 9 "Krimfeldzug // Verlorene Siege" = chapter 9 "Crimea Campaign // Lost victories") that it was General Dumitrescu's (CO of the 3rd Rumanian Army) loyalty that eased interactions with Rumanian HQs and troops and that ensured that communication occurred "without any particular complications". He also emphasized that German signal elements, which were embedded with ALL Rumanian HQs (even down to divisional HQs), "facilitated tactfully and - where necessary - energetically the cooperation" [of the different units/the 2 countries' armies].
With German liaison rules in place, it can be assumed that the placement of German signal elements wasn't a measure that was exclusive to the HQ pool of the 3rd Army.
Von Manstein used the word tactful for a reason: The Germans had to keep the Rumanians at it, so German military leaders had to maintain a certain diplomatic tone. Even until 1944, Hitler and the German Supreme HQ (OKW) made various promises to the Rumanian and Hungarian leadership (eg. Rumania was promised to get Bessarabia back, etc.) to make sure that they kept providing troops and that they kept siding with Axis forces.
I assume that bilingual Transylvanian Saxons (German minority in Rumania) were either assigned to support liaison efforts as Rumanian liaison officers/personnel or that they were recruited by the Wehrmacht and then assigned to the signal elements and placed in the Rumanian HQs.
In October 1941, the 3rd Rumanian Army had 128 guns (including 37mm and 47mm AT guns?) and 700 MGs at its disposal, but over 10.000 casualties, due to bitter fighting. At that point, Mansteins staff advised him that the 3rd Army was not capable of conducting offensive operations anymore, let alone defend itself. After its reorganization (and the upgrading of its elements to divisions), the Army regained its offensive capabilities and played a vital role during the Crimea offensive and the capture of Sevastopol in 1942.
The artillery branches of the Rumanian Armies fielded in Russia were particularly weak, as their bombardment elements had only outdated pieces at their disposal (mostly WWI or immediate post-war era). They also lacked medium/heavy pieces, so frontline troops depended on German artillery support, quite often. Except for delivering an amount of MG34s to Rumanian infantry units, the Germans were reluctant to equip the Rumanian artillery branch with modern pieces, and - afaik - also had a tendency to give preference to arty mission requests from German frontline troops. At the same time, (again, afaik) the Germans denied Rumanian requests for ammo support/production for the Rumanian pieces, as the Germans did not want to occupy German factories with the production of foreign shells incompatible with Wehrmacht pieces.
Even though the Germans produced grenades for the huge load of captured Russian mortars and Russian AT guns, eventually, the Rumanians had to take care of their arty ammunition supplies themselves, if I am not mistaken.
The Hungarians were pretty much in the same boat, for the most part, they had a lack of modern/medium/heavy arty pieces, as well.
Afaik, the Italian Army fielded only light field artillery in their field-artillery regiments in 1939, the FA regiments were not allowed to incorporate heavier pieces. This was a showstopper during the Greek Campaign in 1940, so the FA regiments were then allowed to incorporate heavier pieces in the following years. If units received heavier pieces, they were then usually reorganized into heavy FA regiments, but without becoming Corps assets. In general, original heavy FA units were Corps assets, strictly.
Even though Italy's mountain units had removed the 65-mm mountain gun (which could be disassembled and carried in partial loads - by mules or soldiers) from active service in 1920, the 80th artillery regiment of the 80th Infantry Division had actually received those outdated guns in 1942, for instance. While halfway reliable and very sturdy, these guns (introduced in 1913) were leftovers from Italys WWI equipment pool, so they lacked muzzle velocity, punch, accuracy and range (6.800 meters only).
That said, not problems with the communication flow within the command chains but the serious lack of bombardment equipment weakened the efforts of Rumanian and Hungarian units, or even resulted in higher (unnecessary) losses, as Russian defensive fire/lines could not be suppressed. This goes for some Italian units (to some extent), too, but the Italians could call in their heavy Corps pieces (well, in theory - and if available) or call in their own assault guns/tanks, at least .
- i have operated in 0 to -25 in Norway in previous mil career.. we use to wait for it to warm up hahah to 0 degrees then apply ski wax for correct temp... lmao .. suffered a bit of frost nip - that was painful enough -- i have no idea how Germans coped in winter conditions in the east - not only to survive but fight as well in summertime clothing etc... no words...
