Liberation of Taganrog 1943 is available for download

Discussion in 'Command Ops Series' started by CapHillRat, May 16, 2015.

  1. CapHillRat

    CapHillRat Command Ops Scenario Designer

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    Daz likes this.
  2. *budd*

    *budd* Member

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    thx for the scenario. Haven't played yet but did glimpse the map, nice map. Hows the CO2 kursk scenario coming along?
     
    #2 *budd*, May 16, 2015
    Last edited: May 16, 2015
  3. CapHillRat

    CapHillRat Command Ops Scenario Designer

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    Hi Budd. It is coming along. It's a bigger scenario and is about 30% done. I will post some screenshots this week of the map here and on my blog.
     
  4. rjantzi

    rjantzi Member

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    Hi, this is my first attempt at downloading a user scenario. Could you give me a quick explanation detailing which folders I should put the various files in. Thanks
     
  5. CapHillRat

    CapHillRat Command Ops Scenario Designer

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    Hi there. The scenario file should be placed into the scenario folder. The map should be placed into the maps folder and the estab files should be placed inside the estab folder. You should be able to play this scenario after that. Please leave me a comment here if you have any problems. Thanks! - Chris
     
  6. rjantzi

    rjantzi Member

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    Thanks. That worked. BTW, there was a 4th file (an estab file in XML format). Was I supposed to do anything with that?
     
  7. rjantzi

    rjantzi Member

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    Sorry, I just re-read your post and saw that you said, "the estab files should be placed inside the estab folder". I didn't notice the plural on files. Thanks
     
  8. kipanderson

    kipanderson Member

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    Chris,

    Thanks ... happily downloaded and took a quick look at Soviets.. all seems fine.

    Fantastic stuff... first Eastern Front scenario with CO2 :).

    Don’t get any better..!!!


    All the best,

    Kip.
     
  9. CapHillRat

    CapHillRat Command Ops Scenario Designer

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    Great Kip. Hope you enjoy it. It is rather short and small. I tried to simulate a phased withdrawal by the Germans with three lines of objectives that time out.
     
  10. rjantzi

    rjantzi Member

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    Thanks for this scenario. I've played it through quickly one time and found it very enjoyable. The outcome stayed in doubt right until the end when I, unfortunately, came up 500 yards short of the prime objective. :arghh: Close enough that I'll have to try again.
     
  11. CapHillRat

    CapHillRat Command Ops Scenario Designer

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    Great! I am glad you like it.
     
  12. GoodGuy

    GoodGuy Member

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    Beautiful map. I haven't played the scenario yet (no time atm), but I'll run it when I can free some time.

    I know that you marked it as semi-historical scenario, but I saw the AT-Abteilung in the 111th Inf Division with 3 StuG Coys, so I would like to let you know that it would have been an Inf Div's wet dream in that sector (and especially at that time) to have that amount of armored fire power.

    I don't know the details of the operation (not my field of interest atm) that cut off the (new / re-established ) 6th Army's XXIX Korps, but XXIX. Korps must have had 5 divisions (including the 13. Panzer-Division) and the main (central) pocket was reduced to 25 square kilometers later on, eventually, while units in the Taganrog sector could still retreat to the west along the coast line and then exit the pocket (partially fighting).The German airfield at Taganrog was one of 6 airfields that had provided air-supply for the encircled 6th Army in Stalingrad, by the way.

    Anyway, I hope you don't mind if I post what I know about the operation, so far:

    In the XXIX. Korps sector, elements of the 111. Inf Div., on the southern flank of the Russian 5th Shock Army's push and the Korps commanded by Mieth on the northern flank had tried to cut the trail of Russian troops (I think the 4th mech Guards Corps and the 4th Cavalry Corps) that had pushed to the West on 18th of August and the following days and that was then supposed to move south to Natalyevka to encircle XXIX. Korps, but it took Generalmajor Picker's Kampfgruppe (further east), which had only 1 bty of StuG tanks and 2 AT-Coys at its disposal, attacking the trail on its northern flank to create a corridor with a width of 3 kilometers, eventually, which could be held for a couple of days, until the Russian 4th Mech Guards Corps turned to rectify the situation, widening the Russian trail/corridor to a width of 9 kilometers. Initiallially, the 13. Panzer-Division, or what was left of it, was on the Northern flank and assigned to Kampfgruppe Picker and sent into the battle for the German corridor on 23rd of August 1943, but it was pulled out (as it had operated without success) and sent south (through the German corridor) on a forced march to reach and help XXIX Korps, before the corridor would be closed again. After the Russian 4th Mech Guards had rectified the situation and closed the German corridor, it was ordered to pick up the inital plan again and move south with the 4th Cavalry Corps to perform the entrapment of the 6th Army's XXIX. Korps. The task of the Mech. Guards was to protect the Western flank of this push down south, while the Cavalry Corps pushed down to reach Natalyevka.

    It seems that the 13. Panzer-Division (so reduced in size that it had the strength of a Panzergrenadier-Regiment and 7 tanks, only) had supported the 111. ID attempting to break through (note: from the inside of the almost closed pocket) and unite with Mieth's Korps north and northwest of the (at the time) pretty large sector that was not a pocket, yet, but both units' efforts were unsuccessful.

    The rough positions of XXIX: Korps' units:

    Karte_-_Kämpfe_am_Mius_August_1943.png

    On the 27th of August, the Russians halted, even though the encirclement had not been completed at that point, because they had to get resupplies (mainly ammo, but also fuel and food). The same day, 6th Army hastily ordered XXIX. Korps to strip all its rear-elements and evacuate them to Mariupol, as it was obvious now that XXIX. Korps was threatened to get encircled. The Russian 2nd Guards Army and the 28th Army reduced the Northern part of the pocket, basically by steadily pushing from the horizontal trail down to the middle of the pocket, while other elements in the south pushed west and then north to the middle of the pocket, while the 44th Army performed a curved move, first west, then south, right towards Taganrog, which was reached on 30th of August and captured the next day. Mieth was given the bulk of the 3rd Mountain Division and the bulk of the 17th Panzer-Division to cut off and seal the Russian trail, and he then pushed, attacked several times and reached Kuteinikowo, near the "elbow" of the hook (to the south) performed by the Guards and the Cavalry Corps, on the 30th of August, eventually, but that position was still way west and slightly north of the initial position of the 111. ID elements, so that Mieth's units could not be used to help with the breakthrough.

    The 13. Pz.Div, which had elements of the 111. Inf Div in its rear (means slighty northeast of it), had moved south to Jekaterinovka and on 30th of August (I think) all infantry divisions of XXIX. Korps withdrew from their positions. XXIX. Korps' 13. Pz.Div then spearheaded a breakthrough attempt in the western part of the pocket, which was reduced to 25 square kilometers at that point already, with the bulk of XXIX.'s Infantry Divisions behind it or somewhat further south, and pushing as well. On the next day, the breakthrough was accomplished by General Brandenberger's unit (forgot which one he was commanding ;p), but somewhat further south at Konkovo, so that the Korps units could exfiltrate during the night (of the 31st and the 1st of September).

    Before the pocket was reduced to that size, 2 escape routes (from Taganrog) were available. Elements of the 117. Artillery Regiment must have been in the Taganrog area for sure, as I have read parts of the 3rd Bn commander's adjutant's letters (to his wife), who committed suicide on the beach of the Sevastopol pocket later on. The following map, which was drawn and put online by a German author who analyzed all of the adjutant's deployments and the letters to reconstruct his personal fate, displays these 2 routes that were used by the elements inside the pocket, after Hitler had allowed to withdraw from the Mius sector to a sector east of Melitopol, where the 111. ID was then ordered to form the 6th Army's Wotan-line at the eastern outskirts of Melitopol, in late September or early October. According to the Adjutants letters, it sounds like his unit (the 3rd Bn of the 117. Artillery-Regiment) retreated along the southern escape route:

    escape-routes-tagabrog.jpg

    The folks at Lexikon of the Wehrmacht emphasize that the 111. ID's retreated on the route Uspenskaya (which must have been west or northwest of the pocket), Melitopol (where it had to perform some heavy defensive action) and then moved to the bridgehead at Nikopol, before it was inserted on the Crimea by sea, as the Crimea was already cut off at the time.
    Other elements of the 111. Inf Division held some heights east of Taganrog until all units of XXIX. Korps were ordered to withdraw and were actually not attacked by the Russian units in front of them. These Russian units were probably elements of rifle divisions and either to weak to attack, or not ordered (or not in the mood ;p to attack) to push, giving the Russian 44th Army's units the opportunity to kill something.

    When the battle started, the 336. Inf Div was placed in the north, the 17th Inf Div in the center and the 15. Luftwaffen-Felddivision in the South. Since the 15. Lw-FD was rather weak (it's Recon element was just a bicycle company, and this ID's establishment was interrupted/never completed, because it was rushed into battle in late 1942), I am guessing that it was then decided to have elements of the 111. Inf Div to occupy the heights just east of Taganrog and the town itself. I am also guessing that vital frontline elements (if not the bulk) of the 111. Inf Div was in the northwestern part of the pocket, and not in the Taganrog area.

    ---

    During the 2nd Battle at the Mius described above, the initial Russian main pushes occured just north and south of Kuibyschewo, way north of Tabanrog, just like during the 1st attempt (1st Battle at the Mius, which started on 17th of July), where the Germans managed to re-establish the old main battle line (at the river Mius, with the help of several SS-divisions) around 2nd of August eventually, and where then ALL German units re-occupied their spots at the old main line.

    But since the Russians had reinforced their front line units at the Mius with their own (rear-line) troops, as High Command either didn't want to send or couldn't send reinforcements, the 5th Shock Army and the Guards (etc.) could mount another offensive on the 18th of August, already. The war diary of the German 336. Inf Div. explicitly states that captured Russian soldiers reported that all divisional or Coy (supply) columns were combed-out completely, some even to a level where the columns had almost ceased to exist, and where then these troops were incorporated into the frontline units, to replace (some of) the losses. This info and other intelligence pieces made the Germans think that another attack would not be imminent, and it can be assumed that - prior to the offensive - the higher Russian traffic behind the frontline, which was in fact detected during several short-range (aerial) recon runs, was accounted to the Russians shuffling around these rear-line contingents, because motorized or railroad reinforcement from outside the sector could not be spotted and had not occured, indeed. On the 18th of August, the Russian attack then surprised the Germans, indeed, and even more surprising to the Germans, the Russians then pretty much attacked in the same area, where several German units had been pulled out (which weakened these sectors) recently, so that less units were covering the frontline (6th Army had to cover 200 kilometers), now.

    ----


    The following is a scan of the original form reporting the actual ("Ist") and the required ("Soll") strength (troops and weapons) of the 336. Infantry-Division, as of 1st of September 1943 (the day after XXIX. Korps had managed to escape):

    T-315 R-2096 Scan0122.jpg

    The section "gepanzerte Fahrzeuge" (armored vehicles) states that the unit had no tanks, but 14 SPGs ("Pak" means AT and "SF" means SPG) as required number, where the actual number of vehicles amounted to 50% ( or 7) operational ("einsatzbereit") vehicles and some additional 2 vehicles that were in the repair-shop. The target number of 14 AT vehicles surely means that the division's AT Bn was supposed to have an SPG company, usually the 3rd Bn, while the towed AT guns were usually operated by the 1st and the 2nd Bn. In the weapons ("Waffen") section of the form, you can see the required amount of heavy AT guns ("schwere Pak" or "s.Pak", which referred to 75mm AT guns at the time, but 50mm guns were also used), 21 guns, but an actual amount of 2 operational guns, and where even these 2 are marked with an asterix, referring to the SPG ("SF")-section, which makes me think that the AT guns of the 2 vehicles in the repair shop had been removed (before the vehicles were sent to the shop) and put on a wheeled carriage of a knocked out gun, to have at least TWO towed 75mm AT guns, until the repaired SPGs are returned.
    The 3rd section in the form allows to enter the missing amount of horses, and that paragraph states that 500 horses are needed to re-establish the full mobility of the unit.
    While it's pretty obvious that the unit must have lost quite some of the equipment during the fighting withdrawal (the number could only be guesstimated if the preceding actual/target report would be checked), it's also obvious that the unit must have had way more transportation (horses) and at least some more AT guns, before. But it's also pretty clear, that the unit's AT Bn did not have 3 assault gun Coys (StuG), and I don't even think that such guns were regular parts of their T/O&E, at the time. Some AT Bns' third Bn even had 20mm or 40mm AA guns, instead of AT guns, as the former had proven to be effective tools against unarmored columns and Inf formations, other AT Bns had either a SPG Coy, or (really rare afaik) a Stug Coy.

    Basically, AT Bns had 3 Coys, where some of the 3rd Bns comprised of Marder AT SPGs, instead of a third towed heavy AT gun Coy. After the T/O&E change in October 1943, AT Bns were supposed to have six 37mm Pak 35/36, 24 50mm Pak 38 and 18 75mm Pak guns, before a StuG company (as third or first Coy) became common later in the war, Pak 35/36 could only serve as "Army doorknocking devices" (a joke common among soldiers).

    Technically, only the 75mm Pak 40 guns could penetrate a KV-1 tank or the T-34's frontal armor, for example, a 50mm Pak 38 had to perform a lucky shot in the rear/side or in the turret ring of a KV-1, in order to penetrate such a beast.

    Whatsoever, regarding the AT Bn, the 111. Inf Div's AT Bn might have had a similar layout, where the actual number of AT pieces (vehicles and towed guns) prior to the attack would have to be researched, though. I might check the KStN some time, as I don't think StuGs were regular parts of an AT Bn at the time. Prior to the attack, commanders in that sector stressed that not equipment, but the actual number of available troops was the most serious problem. The 336. Inf Div's actual strength was 9160 troops (incl officers and NCOs), whereas it required strength amounted to 16992 troops.
    My guess is, that this unit's AT Bn suffered of a similar understrength situation and of a similar hodgepodge mix of AT weapons, and that there were no StuG guns at hand. I may be wrong, though, like I said, that corner of the Campaign is not my thing.

    EDIT: My 22.7 cents
     
    #12 GoodGuy, May 25, 2015
    Last edited: May 26, 2015
  13. CapHillRat

    CapHillRat Command Ops Scenario Designer

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    That seems to be a little more than 2 cents...maybe 3 cents! Thanks for the research!
     
    11C1959 likes this.
  14. CapHillRat

    CapHillRat Command Ops Scenario Designer

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    To cobble this small scenario together I relied primarily on wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taganrog_during_World_War_II#Liberation_of_Taganrog and some inferences to the fighting in Manstein's book. The wiki sources are primarily Russian from the look of the notes. Not that it matters. I'd trust the German records you source at this point over the Soviet ones based on all of the other EF reading I've done and the discrepancies between the two armies in record keeping!
     
  15. GoodGuy

    GoodGuy Member

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    Yeah, I corrected that part already.... changed it to "22.7 cents". :)

    Losses of the 336. Inf Division from 18th of August (the start of the Russian attack) to 4th of September : 3305 men.

    T-315 R-2096 Scan0184-Verluste-August-43.jpg

    Schnelle Abteilung (Schn. Abt., translates to "fast Bn") refers to the Division's Recon Bn, most likely.

    I might find some actual strength reports dated 1st of August from the XXIX. divisions, when I have time, which would give you a perfect idea of the loadout/setup prior to the Russian offensive. I also own copies of 1944 KStN (required strength) sheets, so i could check these, when I have some spare time.
     
    #15 GoodGuy, May 25, 2015
    Last edited: May 26, 2015
  16. GoodGuy

    GoodGuy Member

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    Just to give an idea about how demanding a forced march/breakout must have been for the troops of an Inf Div that was not fully motorized and that had a general lack of transportation (like many Inf Divisions that contained a large amount of horse-drawn vehicles):
    The report from 1st of September also includes complaints about the amount of stragglers (sure, after breaking out of the pocket) trying to find their ways back to their units (slowly, mostly on foot), and it emphasizes that the 3rd Bn Gren. Regiment 686 (the 2nd Regiment of ID. 336) was particularly weak, as some

    • 90% of the troops in that Bn were footsore,
    • 75% of them had diarrhea and
    • 50% of them illnesses with fever,

    so that this weakened unit could only march 10 kilometers per day, at that point :dead:, but it still managed to keep the retreat going, it seems.

    The big picture (outlining the plan for the offensive) shows that Stalino was the main goal, and trapping 6th Army/XXIX. Korps one of the main secondary goals:

    Karte_-_Offensivplanungen_der_Süd-_und_Südwestfront_1943.jpg
     
    #16 GoodGuy, May 25, 2015
    Last edited: May 25, 2015
  17. GoodGuy

    GoodGuy Member

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    Well some entries on the Russian wiki are actually correct, others are exaggerated or somewhat inaccurate.
    https://translate.googleusercontent.com/translate_c?depth=1&hl=de&ie=UTF8&prev=_t&rurl=translate.google.de&sl=ru&tl=en&u=https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/416-%D1%8F_%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0%D1%8F_%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%B8%D1%8F_(2-%D0%B3%D0%BE_%D1%84%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F)&usg=ALkJrhiJ0YObouS51Yei85pFB_B8oykbYQ#.D0.9E.D1.81.D0.B2.D0.BE.D0.B1.D0.BE.D0.B6.D0.B4.D0.B5.D0.BD.D0.B8.D0.B5_.D0.A2.D0.B0.D0.B3.D0.B0.D0.BD.D1.80.D0.BE.D0.B3.D0.B0

    The Russian wiki entry above - covering the liberation of Taganrog - states that the 44th Army's 416th Division entered the outskirts of Taganrog at 5 a.m. on the 30th of August and that it completed the liberation by 7:30 pm the same day, after having performed a 20 km-push south towards Taganrog. That surely means that the units in front (east) of the elements of the German 111. Inf Div never attacked, indeed.
    Search requests made by descendants of German MIA soldiers hint towards the presence of the 50th Grenadier-Regiment (or some of its sub-units) in Taganrog, at least.

    A detailed map from the war diary of the 336. Inf Division detailing the positions of the 111. Inf Divisions lined up at Uspenskaya (I do not know where that town/village is or was located, yet) on the 27th of August, at 6 a.m. :

    T-315 R-2095 Scan850-Uspenskaya.jpg

    The arrows just north and east of Uspenskaya display Russian attacks that were repulsed, the large note in the sector assigned to the 686th Grenadier-Regiment translates to: "enemy forces could not be identified, as prisoners had not been made". The southern sector was held by the 15. Luftwaffenfeld-Division, but the 111. Inf Div was assigned to the sector northwest of Uspenskaya !!!
    Elements of the 111. ID were actually encircled in Uspenskaya, but they managed to break out and escape with the other units of the XXIX, so I really wonder where that town was, now, hehe.

    On the 29th of August the 111. Inf Div was placed on the left flank of the 15. Luftwaffen-Division at Latonovo, southeast of Anastasiyevka (entering "Anastasiyevka Ukraine" in google maps might actually lead to the historical location, as the village southeast to it is Latonovo, on there, indeed):

    T-315 R-2095 Scan852-Lotonovo.jpg

    That's it for now, need some rest.
    With the current info level, I'd say the bulk of the 111. ID was busy northwest of Taganrog and busy defending and joining/following the 13. Pz.Div's attempt to breakout, minus the 50. Grenadier-Regiment (or elements of it) and minus the 117. Artillery-Regiment (or elements of it) which then left their positions in or east of Taganrog around the 30th of August. Russian sources state that the Russian 416th Division cleared remaining forces in Taganrog ("street by street"), it's not totally clear, though, as the Krupp facilities operated in Taganrog were ordered to evacuate machines, slave workers and material (not sure if this was accomplished with machines and material, a number of workers had tried to avoid evacuation and kept hiding inside and outside the city until the liberation, just to get accused of collaboration with the enemy, afterwards, btw.), industrial facilities and power plants were then demolished, with a number of buildings burning (due to the "scorched earth" order), so it's possible that they "just" wiped out remnants that had covered the withdrawal and that the Russian propaganda spiced it up, a bit, as the 111. ID elements cleary managed to withdraw from the heights east of Taganrog, and as elements of its Art.Regt clearly retreated west along the coast, according to witness accounts.

    If you ever want to create a Taganrog 2.0 version, or if you ever want to re-arrange the scenario, I might be able to help (if I have time).
    I know I haven't even played the scenario yet, and it's a semi-historical scenario, so I hope you don't take my 22.7 cents as critizism, bashing or whatever.
    Cheers.
     
    #17 GoodGuy, May 26, 2015
    Last edited: May 26, 2015
  18. GoodGuy

    GoodGuy Member

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    I'll replace all the linked images that can't be viewed in my posts above with uploads to this forum in a few. EDIT: Done, pls check the pictures in my posts above.

    I found 2 documents backing up my (quoted) theorie, meanwhile:

    The following document is a headcount of troops that had to be supplied with food (by the 336. Inf.Div and more so by its superior's base, means the 6th Army's base, as Army Korps did not have a base/such infrastructure, IIRC):

    T-315 R-2095 Scan1046-Headcount-336.jpg

    The document above was kept in the war diary, it seems, but it actually lists the units that were assigned ("zugeteilte Einheiten") to the 336. ID on the 24th of August, as well.
    The 2nd Bn (?) of Artillery-Regiment 117 had been canceled, as well as the 2nd (?) Bn of Grenadier-Regiment 95 (an organic part of the 17. Infantry-Division). The complete Heavy Artillery-Regiment 777, the Mixed AT Company 17 (from 17. Inf.Div) and the Light Artillery Bn (2nd Bn of ArtRegt 140, I guess) are still listed. 11740 men are listed as troops belonging to the 336. ID, as - let me call it - innate contingent, 1505 men as the total amount of subordinated "borrowed" troops. The latter number looks reasonable.

    The next document, from the same film roll, is a telex that reports the actual strength of the units of the 336. Infantry Division to the I.a. officer of XXIX. Korps, but it also reports the "borrowed" elements that were subordinated (!) on that day. The report was filed on the 25th of August, so it should display the actual situation on the 25th.

    T-315 R-2095 Scan1063(336-mit-111-ID-zugeilt.jpg

    Interestingly, the telex lists a bunch of 117 units, even though the element of Artillery-Regiment 117 had been canceled a day before. This means that this time "I./117" is referring to the 1st Bn of Grenadier-Regiment 117, "II./117" to the 2nd Bn of Gren.Regt 117, "II./70" to the 2nd Bn of Inf.Regt 70 and "13./117" to the 13th Coy of Gren.Regt 117. My interpretation may be correct, as the 117. Artillery-Regiment had only 12 sub-units (called batteries). The 3rd Bn of Gren.Regt 21 is also listed ("III./21"), which is pretty interesting, as that Rgt was an organic sub-unit of the 17. Infantry Division,

    These numbers detailing the subordinated non-organic elements are very low, though, so I'm still not 100% sure, and the separately listed 2./117 confuses me (as it could refer to the 2nd bty of ArtyRegt 117), too, but all artillery units are listed in a separate section ("Artillerie") right below, listing present and lent (or disbanded?) organic 336 components along with the the borrowed elements (ie. "II./140"), so my interpretation seems to make sense. Some officers in the divisional HQs didn't maintain a consistent level when numbering units (lack of time or no accurateness), though.

    There are handwritten notes, and it seems like someone canceled the entry F.E.B. ( = "Feldersatz-Bataillon", translating to Field Replacement Bn), which refers to the 15. Luftwaffen-Division, and added "Auffüller" (I think, translating to replenishments), which looks like the officer had listed the 143 troops coming from the 15. LW-Division's own Field replacement Bn as "borrowed", at first, but was then informed - or it was then decided - that the troops could be kept, to up the 336.'s actual strength. This also leads to me thinking that the LW-Division's F.E.B., as its parent Div never got even near the required strength and which must have been way understrength already, anyways, had been "milked" to replenish a stronger/more experienced unit, at least. The 15. LW-Division was disbanded some time after XXIX. had escaped from the pocket.

    Whatsoever, it's pretty clear now that quite some of the organic elements of the 111. Inf.Div were deployed near Uspenskaya and at Lotonovo (sp?) until the 29th of August, at least, while the remaining elements either deployed in or at Taganrog, and maybe some of them also sent to help out the 15. Luftwaffen-Felddivision (which never completed the establisment) or the 17. Inf Div.

    Now, someone needs to be so kind and find me that damn nest Uspenskaya, haha. :couchpotato:
     
    #18 GoodGuy, May 26, 2015
    Last edited: May 26, 2015
  19. GoodGuy

    GoodGuy Member

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    This scenario is actually a tough nut to crack.
    Basically, you can achieve a victory, but only if you detach each and every bombard unit and if you shell incoming Russians (manually) constantly, even if they are moving in with speed.

    My first attempt, but it was anything than easy, it involved an arty click-fest, and sometimes concentrated arty fire (bundled arty units), to make the Russians halt and search for cover:

    Taganrog-victory.jpg

    If you check the overview map at the top left, only 10 Russian units got to the shipyard, 3 units got to a position near the airfield, and 4 units bypassed the decimated Recon Bn, but I lost all but 2 StuG in the process. I then redirected the remaining Assault gun HQ (the lone survivor) with its remaining StuGs (3) to the road leading up to the Valkyrie line #3, and ordered it to take position in the woods providing a view on the road. Basically, it acted as spotter for my arties (see fire support window :) ), and it inflicted heavy casualties on the column for a while, until it lost 1 StuG and until it had to retreat some 150-200 meters. The training Bn of the 167. Inf Div then helped to route the attackers that closed in to finish the StuG section and managed to clean the top left of the wood, so that the huge blob of Russian units is still being kept in check (and plastered in the open by arty , *evil grin*).

    My units lost 2032 troops, 38 AFVs, 42 guns, but killed 3010 Russian troops, and destroyed 74 guns and forced 9 units to surrender. Not bad, I guess. 34 of my units' AFVs were destroyed by "RPGs", which in this case means by RPG grenades (note: not RPG launchers), in close combat. That hurts. Their grunts were in for some dirty work.

    The Russians got me so busy that I forgot to pull back to the Mius line, but only 1 lone Russian unit tried to occupy the sector at the southern bridge, and got repulsed by the dug in combat engineers I had put in front of the bridge, to make sure that stragglers don't attack/capture the troops of the divisional HQ and its base unit (both stayed on the left river bank, and since I detached all arties and Regts and never moved them, they had enough time to dig in).

    Challenging scenario.
     
    #19 GoodGuy, May 27, 2015
    Last edited: May 28, 2015
  20. 76mm

    76mm Member

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    Hi, I just played this scenario as my first with the Command Ops engine. cool scenario, and I really like the engine, but the learning curve is pretty steep. No hexes--whoa!

    One question for you: the objectives in the Valkyrie line show that I'll get points if I hold them from D1, 12:00 to D2, 05:59. I did so, but didn't get any points--was I doing something wrong? I didn't have units sitting right on top of them but as far as I know there also weren't any Sov units nearby.
     

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