General withdrawal: In reality, and at medium range, the bulk of a Coy could disengage, while a rear guard, eg. one or another LMG team, maybe a sniper and one or another NCO, or maybe even one full platoon, would cover the withdrawal. Currently, and with order delay, it is virtually impossible to stop a unit from marching into a defending/dug in enemy unit, as neither a corrective move order nor a withdrawal order would stop the advance. The "taking cover" state will make the unit stop, if the unit gets under moderate - heavy fire, at least, but your unit will end up retreating most of the time. The adaptive order delay I suggested elsewhere could help here, but the function is still barely usable. In general, you end up with a unit that runs into an enemy unit at full speed (while even seeing the enemy the whole time) and that keeps moving at speed until it gets covered with bullets, with order delay. Setting max aggro will make the unit take cover and deploy earlier (and often at a larger distance), but you basically still end up with a unit sitting in the open (basically like a goldfish in a bowl) or even on the enemy's lap, while in reality such column - depending on the order, would either just hit the reverse gear to regroup at a safe distance, or avoid the area entirely and pick a different route. It's in these instances where it becomes frustrating that scouting is not implemented. Historically, a march column moving through contested or unknown (enemy) territory, used to send scout cars, a halftrack or even just a motorbike with sidecar forward, to screen the road sections ahead. But even without orders delay a deliberate withdrawal can hardly be achieved, as your unit will just cling to the enemy unit, even if you hit minimum aggro and max. casualties right away (which you should always do when using that order), so your unit will end up in the uncontrollable retreat mode in 90% of the cases, and where it might even retreat right into the next enemy unit that's waiting for "dinner". My suggestion would be to review and alter retreating and routing, and introduce new types/options: 1) deliberate retreat (yellow) .... where the engine gives you the opportunity to determine the general direction of the retreat. If the CO ordered a retreat, then the troops used to retreat right away, once the word reached them. Depending on terrain and amount of natural cover, this could involve running back all the way to the FUP (or a safe spot) or the hasty "cover hopping", means hopping/running from one cover to the next until the soldiers reached a relatively safe spot that was out of range of the enemy or at distances where the enemy couldn't place aimed shots anymore. During such retreats, weaponry had to be dropped sometimes (say an LMG, a light mortar, or an leIG 18 that had been moved to close to the front, or extra ammo), IF its size/weight impeded the retreat, or if the retrieval of the weaponry would have caused casualties. On such retreat, the engine should deduct very small amounts of equipment, say a few rifles, some ammunition, or one or another organic light mortar, simulating that these items had been damaged (eg. grenades or HE shells) or dropped either during the fighting or during the retreat. Historically, a coy's armorer could replace damaged small arms, either by issuing the stocked Ersatz contingent, repaired weapons or by issuing captured small arms, so at least small arms should be replaced after say a few resupply cycles or within the next say 2 days, if there are no casualties. If there are casualties, then the active soldiers just grab the equipment from the dead/wounded. Such computation would then also apply to the enemy's weaponry. If the enemy retreats, then the "winning" friendly unit should be able to grab some gear from the enemy casualties, say Russ. submachine guns (eg. PPSh-41) + ammo. 2) forced retreat (orange) ... this would be the current yellow retreat, where the player has no control over the unit, and where the enemy's strength (or boldness, or the amount of the friendly unit's casualties) forces the friendly unit's retreat. Still, the unit should roughly move towards the point where the FUP was set or where the last order was issued. If that point is too close to the enemy, then the unit should still retreat in the general direction, but move past that point, to gain distance. A higher amount of equipment should be deducted, as this is not a deliberate retreat. If the enemy attacks from the North, then the retreating unit would not retreat NW or NE, it would pick a general direction where it is foreseeable that it will lead to friendly lines or to relative safety, as this type of retreat would be right between a deliberate retreat and a fully panicked routing. 3) routing (red) ... this should be rendered as is, but with a severe deduction of equipment. Troops in wild panic running for their lives have no time (nor the will) to save their heavy EQ. The majority of AT guns, HMGs and medium/heavy mortars should be deducted, and even vehicles to quite some extent. In severe winter conditions, and if the attacked/routing unit was deployed/idle before the attack, some vehicles should be definetely deducted, maybe except for a number of tanks, as their crews were ordered to start their engines and let em run for some 5 minutes every 30 minutes. This would accurately simulate that it was quite cumbersome and time-comsuming to start vehicles in severe winter conditions, as the motor oil or fuel wasn't designed for the harshest conditions/temperatures (extreme heat or extreme cold). A short anecdotal insert: A friend's grandfather was part of the force stuck in the snow near Moscow, in late 1941. Background: At that stage of the war, German motor engine fuel and engine oil was not meant to be used at say -40° Celsius or even below, fuel was usually usable until -20°C (motor engine fuel: -25°C, Diesel fue: -20°C), and engine oil until around -15°C to -20°C. The special engine oil "Motorenöl der Wehrmacht (Winter) Pz", meant to be used in tank engines during "severe" (central european) winter conditions, was even worse, it could only be used at temperatures of around -10° to -15° Celsius, so that units started to mix the "Pz winter oil" with the regular Wehrmacht winter oil, but also with Ethanol (an emergency/tricky solution, Ethanol would vaporize after a while, starting at and above 70°C when the engine warmed up, so the ratio had to be watched constantly). In 1942, the troops received paper charts for the winter season 1942/1943 outlining the "recipe" to mix engine oil and motor engine fuel, 15% fuel were applied at temperatures between -20°C and - 30°C, and 25% fuel at temperatures below -30C°. This ratio was also ordered for all Vehicles that were transported on train waggons. The current ratio could be verified by using the bubble "viskosimeter", the device was part of every vehicle's winter EQ in the next winter. Damper oil had to be treated in the same manner, as the shock absorbers lost almost all of their effectiveness, when the oil thickened, which led to truck breakdowns or even dangerous situations when trucks ferried mines and other finicky equipment. In the next winter 1942/43 (and during the following winter) large heater fans were used in barns or garages, blankets were put over the engines and even fires were allowed by the Wehrmacht in 1942 - if safety measures/rules were applied/followed, like putting a fire extinguisher near the vehicle and protecting (or even removing) fuel lines on the underbody- under the oil pan, as emergency solution. In 1941, with the unprepared equipment, German batteries delivered only 4% of their actual/usual power (at -40°C, compared to at least 26% at -20°C), which - usually - was not sufficient to drive the starter. So in this winter before Moscow, my friend's grandfather, who was the driver or NCO of a truck crew, was pretty much the only guy in his subunit who had put a fire under his truck's oil pan, to prevent an increase of the oil's viscosity, and the heat of the fire was also sufficient to keep the battery at a more favorable temperature, obviously. When the Russian counterattack started and when the Germans had to run for their lives, he was the only guy in his unit who managed to start his car and who got away with his crew in a vehicle. All the other guys had to run for their lives, where many got lost and froze to death or where they were killed or captured. Basically, during this counterattack, most routing units had to drop most of their heavy EQ, an appalling number of vehicles of all types was lost, vehicles were either abandoned (engines wouldn't start), or destroyed/captured by the Russians during the onslaught, heavy guns couldn't be saved, because there was no time left to heat up the tow vehicles. Some tanks managed to get away, but quite a few of them then had to be demolished, because they ran out of fuel, & resupply was rarely an option during that chaotic retreat. That said, a unit should only route if a certain mix of conditions is present at the same time. A selection (or all) of the following conditions should be present before a rout is triggered: a) element of surprise b) superior enemy force size or "combat power" c) low morale or alternatively ... d) low health (explained in Part 3) e) bad supply level (basics, ammo or fuel) For understrength (caused by lack of recruits or by previous engagements) units a f) low personnel level should be included as common trigger as well, unless it's an elite unit with a higher morale/experience level or training level. Such unit wouldn't succumb to superior numbers right away.