Please note that in one very important respect at least - maybe others, I didn't check - it was inaccurate, in that Axis units had panzerfausts, which they didn't at Prokhorovka, or at that point in '43 generally. Makes a diff, in a famous tank battle, and that was one of the reasons I abandoned that effort, because I didn't have an accurate estab.
Mass production must have started around June or July 1943, as the first batch (500 pcs.) of Panzerfaust 30 was delivered to frontline units in August 1943. Interestingly, the delivery of the predecessor, the smaller Faustpatrone, started the same month. While there were no Panzerfausts available in July, a semi-historical scenario/estab could simulate a situation where prototypes were given to frontline units for testing purposes in July.
For the German estabs:
Rotmistrov indicated 400 destroyed German tanks during the Battle of Prokhorovka, including numerous Panthers and Ferdinands.
The II. SS Panzerkorps had no Panthers, nor any Ferdinands, according to historian Frieser, only the
XXXXVIII. Panzerkorps' Panzer-Grenadier-Division Großdeutschland (structured like a Panzer-Division already) had received 200 Panthers, which were combined in the 2 Abteilungen of Panzerbrigade 10, which was attached to Großdeutschland. According to Frieser, 45 of those Panthers broke down on the way to the FUP for Operation Citadel.
Großdeutschland and the 3 divisions of the II. SS-Panzerkorps each had one Tiger Coy (each with 13-15 Tigers) at their disposal. Additionally, Heavy Tank Bn 503 was deployed for the Southern pincer attack, as well.
But according to Frieser, only 15 Tigers were operational on the Southern front on 12th of July, and (of these 15) only 5 fought in the Prokhorovka sector.
Rotmistrov's report, that 70 Tiger tanks had been destroyed during the Battle, is a fairy tale he might have tailored to avoid court-martial.
These wrong numbers were partially based on crew reports, though, as Russian crews had reported the presence/appearance of numerous Tigers, where they in fact had faced the new Panzer IV "Ausführung H" model, which had a more "beefy" silhouette/appearance (see below). Damaged or knocked out PzIV's were then reported as knocked-out Tigers, it seems.
Basically, the biggest encounter occured in a sector where all involved tanks of the II. Panzer-Abteilung of the Leibstandarte were stationary and in a defensive stance, and where this lone Bn had fanned out, in order to be able to defend its relatively large sector.
The attacking Russian tanks then rushed towards their positions in an attempt to fight them in close combat.
Since the Russians performed a mass attack with badly staggered/aligned formations, some of the tanks rubbed against or even rammed each other, due to the high attack speed and probably due to the general nervousness among the crews, who erronously thought they faced Tigers all over the place. On top of that, some Russian intel indicated massed deployments of Tigers.
Quite some of the tanks of the Leibstandarte were lined up behind a large Russian anti-tank ditch, which the Russian planners had not included in their plans, so quite a few Russian tanks fell into the obscured ditch, flipped over or even piled up in there. As the ditch featured only one narrow crossing, the Russian tanks trying to cross it could be knocked out easily.
Russian and German tanks then tried to circle each other - where Russian tanks had actually made it to the German positions - and burning Russian tanks even tried to ram German tanks, in unsuccessful attempts to take the Germans with them on impact, acc. to the Leibstandarte veteran Kurt Pfötsch. A high number of Russian tanks were knocked out at medium and long distances already, though, as the terrain favored the defenders. It seems that the few observers (Russian recon prior to the attack was quite poor) as well as the actual Russian tank crews had incorrectly identified the silhouettes of the new Panzer IV H (with sideskirts and skirts around the turret) of the Leibstandarte as Tigers, so the tank units executed the order to get to distances below 500 meters (for side shots) or even below 300 meters (for frontal attacks), when engaging Tigers.
With mounting losses, Rotmistrov threw more and more tanks into the battle, which failed to achieve territory gains and incurred high losses, as well.
German archive data evaluated by Frieser indicates that the II. Panzerkorps reported 3 total tank losses and 143 tanks damaged (including 25 damaged Tigers) for that day (which includes losses of II. Korps units in neighboring sectors).
Since Frieser indicates that only 15 Tigers were operational on 12th of July (in the South), it's possible that some Tigers were damaged during transfer to the front (eg. aerial attack) or that some Tigers were struck by mines during the transfer to the front. A number of Tigers were struck by German mines during Operation Citadel, actually. It's also possible that a number of Tigers broke down during relocation, a reported "damage" did not necess. involve enemy action, especially with the finicky gearboxes and clutches of the underpowered Tigers. At the end of Citadel, only 13 Tigers had to be rated as total losses, according to Jentz.
Glantz insists on 60-70 lost tanks (did he mean total losses, means destroyed/written off?) in the Korps' entire sector (that day), and he seems to count all types. Glantz does not include the fact that the Germans kept dominating the area after the battle, so that they could retrieve/repair pretty much all (but 3) damaged tanks, in fact.
When the Germans moved back to their initial positions after Citadel was called off, the Russians were able to retrieve and repair some of their abandoned/knocked out/damaged T-34s, as well.
