What you request is a tactical input to the game which builds communications networks. It includes having the equipment, establishing communications points, and laying wires at its barest level.
Dave stated that it's not going to be addressed, which is understandable, so this is a hypothetical discussion.
Not exactly to the last wire, but yes, communication should be rendered (means considered by the code handling coordination and the code handling on-call artillery.
Example. In reality, fast recon elements (small scout cars, or maybe just a Krad unit) sent out far could have found themselves cut-off communications-wise, if they had small radios (say 5 or 10 Watts), as their transmission power was too low.
Even tank radio ranges were pretty low.
For instance, a 5 W radio from a Signal-Abteilung's "small" radio troop (in the radio Coy) had a range of 30 kilometers for voice calls, and 90 km for tapped (morsed) messages, with favorable terrain and under most favorable weather conditions, plus - length (size) of antenna (frame) and time of the day were vital parameters as well. Tapped messages could be tricky at medium and long ranges, as interferences or terrain obstacles could make the messages unreadable, easily. But these Signal elements were motorized and had larger antennas than combat vehicles, eg. tanks. Their 30 W radios had voice radio ranges of around 50 km.
But tanks did not have these (voice) ranges, the antennas were way smaller (1.4 - 2 meters), so even though radios in tanks were even more powerful than some of their (rather) stationary counterparts, their range was usually lower.
Example:
The Panther was equipped with
- the FuG 5 SE 10 U radio (using a 2 meters rod antenna). This was in fact the designation for a set of 2 devices: 1 receiver and a 10 W transmitter. This set allowed for avg. ranges of 6.4 km (voice) and 9.6 km (Morse code), only.
Tank company commanders and platoon commanders received a 2nd UKW receiver (FuG 2), so that the radio operator could tune in to 2 frequencies at the same time.
The command versions ("Befehlswagen") of the Panther received more powerful equipment:
Next to the FuG 5 a Befehlswagen would either have the
- FuG 7 SE 20 U (20 Watts, UKW, voice range 12.8 km, tap range 16 km, using an additional 1 .4 meter rod antenna on the center of the engine cover), or the
- FuG 8 (30 Watts, receiver + transmitter, used for MW medium wave MORSE connections only, using a star antenna on the engine cover - range: 80 km).
So, technically, a Panther platoon or even the bulk of a Coy that wasn't accompanied by a (or lost its) Command tank, slipped out of the commanders' (Coy commander,Bn Co, div. Co, operational Co) voice radio ranges quickly, once it got outside a circle of 6.4 km. Once it got outside the 9.6 Morse range, it couldn't even use morse code anymore.
In the game, these 2 circles would equal 6 and roughly 9 squares (assuming that one square would be 1 km). That's nothing. There are maps in the game that cover sectors of 40 km (correct me if I am wrong), or even more - by now.
Say the aforementioned recon element would have spotted a large target that would have been worth to be plastered with artillery, but its radio-equipment would not have been able to reach the arty unit, let alone any friendly unit, then it had to return to get back into transmission range.
An infantry Bn routing and trapped behind enemy lines, may (after combat) not have possessed the equipment to place medium range radio calls anymore, so that friendly arty pieces from outwards couldn't be called in anymore.
In the game, such dependencies are not present. Any unit can call in bombardments all across the map on enemy units (if in arty range), and tank units that lost or never had command tank versions (to begin with) still receive orders from the Corps/Army HQ, and even if that on-map boss is 30 km away.
That said, imho, that part of the communication business should be in the game, at least. The telephone network is a whole diferent thing, and probably too much detail.
On the other hand, a division's signal Bn had a good number of radios, so large extents of the old-school telephone routine could be abstracted just by adding a delay routine that would put a delay to order execution on the division for orders from the Corps or the Army, as - after a push to a far objective - such connections had to be re-etablished first, or could just be established via morsed messages, which were kept very short and usually restricted to "mission accomplished" msgs, most likely. Once a Div. HQ was established, and once Corps signal elements connected with the unit, all comm means (encrypted teletype, encrypted morse code, radio, telephone, etc.) were then available to connect with Corps and Army. Until that point, the Division sorted its comms, connected all subordinated units (radio, phone - if possible), but sent out messengers or morsed msgs to the higher echelons (Corps, etc.).
The dash performed by Rommel in France 1940 didn't just overextend supply lines, it also created a situation where Corps signals could not catch up with his division. The Corps actually did not know where the large spearheading group was - for quite some time. And a Corps, in my books, is part of the operational command level.
Who was responsible for the operation, when in the battle were they tasked to address it, what was the typical lead time to accomplish their task, and how does that effort fit into the typical CO2 scenario duration?
- The Corps signal element was responsible for establishing (and maintaining) the connections to the attached divisions.
- The division's signal Bn was responsible for establishing and maintaining the connections to the regiments and their Bns. It also had to maintain a connection to the unit (division) on the right side of its parent division. That system enabled the Germans to connect the entire frontline of a Corps sector.
I suspect the communications efforts you cite supported efforts to begin the operational combat, but weren't necessarily a standard operation during the conduct of the operational combat except possibly as it relates to communications among the higher and more static command operations in the theater.
Hmm .... no. Well, fast units (say tanks or armored cars) did not unwind telephone lines from their vehicles during their pushes, of course. But divisional trains and signal elements were quite fast, when it came to establishing comm lines (with some exceptions). Inf Bns put up their (internal) phones quickly, once they got order to halt/rest/dig in.
I may create another thread covering signal procedures, if I have time.