2) Why not two lifts in one day?
3) Why land so far away from the objectives? Fear of Flack is always mentioned but why not attack the Flack towers etc with fighter bombers?
5) Why didn't Gen Gavin go for the Nijmegen bridge on the first day?
6) Why no fighter bomber support to ground troops until it was too late?
Hey Tim, nice to see you around, I hope you are well.
2) If I am not mistaken, the Allies did not have the airlift capacity to accomplish a single-day lift with single-towed gliders, as British
and US paras had to be dropped. While they had amassed ~ 1,050 transport planes, they also had to provide tow planes for 516 (?) gliders. The Allies conducted almost 2,300 glider flights, so they had a sufficient number of gliders, obviously, but the number of tow planes was limited.
Logistically, the organization of the first airlift was already even more complex than the (supposed) "1,000-bombers" attacks on German cities.
Both columns - rather armadas - (2 routes) of the first lift's airborne contingent span across 150 km. While the first drops occured around noon on Day 1 (correct me if I am wrong), I am guessing that the last planes of the armada returned to England during late afternoon. A part of the 2nd wave would have ended up as a night drop (a no-no for the gliders). Some COs feared to replay Normandy experiences.
Lt. General Brereton's opinion was instrumental, as he altered the Market Garden (MG) plan:
The blueprint - the Linnet plan - had projected double-tow lifts (2 gliders pulled by 1 tow plane !), which would have doubled the size of the glider contingent on Day 1. He thought double-tow lifts to be too dangerous (AA, collisions).
This deprived the paras of a subst. amount of heavy weapons.
In fact, a less dangerous AA level could have been assumed, due to the element of surprise + because the Germans considered Nijmegen + Arnheim to be calm areas.
3) US commanders criticized that the projected British DZs/LZs were too far from the objectives. The Nijmegen zones were also relatively far away from the main objectives, indeed.
One of the reasons: the effectiveness of the German AA screen for Day 1 was completely overrated.
Air cover + CAS:
Around 370 fighters escorted the transport planes and glider combos on the Northern transport route, 548 fighter planes escorted the planes using the southern route.
Before the paras were dropped, 212 Thunderbolts had attacked all identified AA installations - all over the theater. Additionally, 48 Mitchell and 24 Douglas bombers had been sent to hit military installations (bunkers, troop quarters, etc.) in Nijmegen, Deelen (airfield), Ede and Kleve (the German city "near" the Groesbeek Heights, which was known to hold training/recruitment centers).
The lack of thorough aerial recon + occasional sophisticated camouflage reduced the effectiveness of those air strikes.
Example: The Flak tower at the Grave bridge was camouflaged, I doubt that aerial recon had managed to identify the flak tower, and I don't think that particular tower was hit/attacked.
Despite one misdrop (E Company) at grave, the 2nd Bn 504th (?) had to collect their troops first, before they could attack the town of Grave. The preliminary bridge assault itself turned out to be lucky/easy, according to Antony Beevor:
The platoon that happened to be the closest plt. to the bridge didn't wait for the rest of the Coy + attacked the bridge. They were greeted by small arms fire, but the bridge was not blown up. 2 trucks turned up, w/ the co-drivers firing at the platoon, which looked like the trucks would spawn reinforcements any second, but the drivers were obv. instructed to save the vehicles + run.
The platoon seized a building with a direct LoF on the flak tower's roof, sniped the 20-mm flak crew, manned the gun + used it to fire at the bunker on the other end of the bridge. That bunker's crew had either been killed or fled in the process.
Since the rest of the Bn had to be scraped together, first, the 2nd Bn planned a night attack on Grave but got delayed by a lone German tank, which fired a few rounds + disappeared. Shortly after, a German recon car + a horse-drawn vehicle were smashed by US mines brought and laid by the Paras to protect the bridge. Another delay, as the troops had to ensure that the bridge defenses were reinforced again, first.
While the Germans funneled clueless troops around Nijmegen, scores of citizens looted alcohol stocks (piled up in the Turmac factory) the Germans had stolen from Dutch companies and civilians. They ran to the factory randomly grabbing crates, bottles and random stuff, the whole ordeal looked like columns of busy ants throughout the surrounding streets.
The Germans in and around the city almost panicked, as they were scared to lose control of the city + started to randomly send inf detachments through the city, where no Allies could be sighted, though, instead of reinforcing the bridge defenses.
Model insisted not to blow the bridge (until it was too late).
Meanwhile Gavin told Arie Dirk Bestebreurtje, the Dutch liaison officer (he had fled to England in 1940 and joined the Princess Irene Bde + then British SOE) who had been in the Nijmegen area before the 82nd dropped and who was tasked to advise the 82nd Airborne in Nijmegen, that "we are not interested in the bridge at this moment" (rough quote), which utterly frustrated the dutch officer, as he advised to use the current chaos to seize the bridge right away.
Gavin expected a "hell of a (German) reaction" from the Reichswald vicinity (aiming at the Groesbeek heights), according to Bestebreurtje.
Gavin had still dispatched 1 Bn of the 508th to move to Nijmegen + occupy a position where it could quickly assault the bridge when they got the signal that the Groesbeek Heights were ultimately secured.
Gavin orderd the CO of the 508th, Lindquist, to make sure that the assault on the bridge would be commenced along the eastern river bank to avoid getting blocked by German elements inside the city. The Bn was ordered to move around Nijmegen to get to that FUP, explicitly. Instead, Lindquist agreed to some advice from a resistance fighter to enter the city from the southern main road. The ensuing firefights + chaos inside the city (during the night) created another vital delay + a no. of casualties.
Meanwh., the Germans had pulled the main forces back across the river to defend the bridge from the northern bank.
According to Beevor, Gavin asserted after the war, that he saw Lindquist as the least able rgt. commander in his Div, b/c he supp. lacked "the killer instinct" + the willingness to "go all-out". If true, then it puzzles me why he had sent Lindquist to overview the assault.
Since Gavin was criticized a lot by historians after the war, this could have been some form of relativization/blame game, I don't know. Fact is, his decision contributed to the destruction of the British airborne.
A chain of indiv. events + decisions piled up + created the massive delay in the sector.
Lack of proper intel:
Some recent infos - based on aerial photographs that were ordered to verify particular Dutch resistance reports - had indicated that SS units were parked in woods and camo'ed in positions near or around Arnheim, but these infos were held back by Monty, for quite a bit, and I am not sure if Eisenhower had been informed or how he had rated the presence of these units. If am not mistaken, Monty claimed that the operation couldn't be postponed/altered anymore anyways, and that 1 somewhat more punchy SS unit would not be able to change the outcome of this giant operation.
Political disputes:
The op. also had a political element: the British ET Command demanded to control a major offensive against Germany + grew tired of folks around Eisenhower, who stressed that the supply lines were overextended + that the US had to regroup before commencing their push across the Siegfried Line. Imho, Eisenhower gave in, in order to silence Monty. Instead of wasting resources on MG, an earlier clearing of the Scheld estuary could have made the harbor in Antwerpen available in early October already, which would have improved the supply situation earlier.
Adverse events:
With the captured territory (Nijmegen + Elst area, etc.), the Ardennes front had to be thinned out or manned with beat up units from the Hürtgen Forest theater, as the Germans still had to be pushed back to Kleve to the East, and pushed out of the towns s'-Hertogenbosch, Breda and Bergen and the Scheldt estuary.
5) KG Heinke prevented the advance party of the 508th, which was dispatched to screen the Nijmegen bridge + its defenses, from reaching the ordered position. Afaik, Gavin had no intel regarding enemy forces just south east of the bridge (minor roads through polders) + right at the bridge.
6) MG was the only WF op where the Germans had air superiority (Sept. 18/19). While 300 German fighter planes were put under Model's command, bad weather (GB/Be) + disputes betw. US + British COs prevented aerial support on September 18, even though the weather in the theater had completely cleared up. German AA + fighter bombers kicked in, even though the area's AA screen was in a deep slumber before the landings.
Brereton insisted that all Allied CAS a/c in Belgium remained grounded on September 18, even though the weather in the MG theater offered perfect flying weather, while his planes resumed their missions. Pretty disturbing intervention, I wonder how he substantiated that request.
He also prevented night drops (which would have created a powerful momentum if executed as preliminary night attack on the Nijmegen bridge (16th/17th of September)). His argument: dark moon.