SITREP

[john connor]

You have the manual? See page 16 and on.

 

[Dave 'Arjuna' O'Connor]

You connect via LAN or internet.

 

[Dave 'Arjuna' O'Connor]

SITREP 1 Dec 23017 (copied from Steam)

Hi all. I was aiming to get out the patch and release the new Bradley at Bay module today. But for a host of reasons that has not happened. For that I'm sorry. It's not that we aren't working hard, far from it. It's more that once you pull a peice of sting on a great ball of it it tends to unravell. Command Ops is a complex beast and making mods to one aspect has impacts on another.

A few months back I had two major objectives to fulfill. These were born from the feedback you people have given me about how Cmd Ops is performing. The first was to reduce the overall casualties being inflicted. They were just too high when compared with historical figures. The second was to look into the on call arty system and see if the reports of arty staying idle for long periods were true.

I started working on the artillery code and in particular I was following up on feedback here about the lack of on call fire support in certain situations. When I investigated this I found that there were a few anomalies and so I began modifying the code. But that simple fix has led to a long time spent peeling away the layers of the onion. Once I overhauled the way units could request fire support and the way that request went up the line and was actioned I then realised that the overall effects of arty now had to be reviewed.This in turn led to an examination and overhaul of how bombardments are conducted and this led to a lot of research into casualty effectiveness from arty. Once I was satisfied that we had a more realistic arty system I then had to ensure that the overall ratio of cas from arty was right.

Historically you will see statements that 70 to 80 percent of all cas in WW2 was caused by arty. But I suspect that figure is derived from the number of cas reported from shrapnel. Many weapons cause shrapnel, PArt of the problem I faced was that from our fire event logs I could see that a good portion of APer fires were in fact heavy weapons firing HE over direct sights, such as tank guns, IGs and mortars. If I was to get the ratio of cas right I needed to separate these out. So I have split APer into two - APer from small arms and APer from heavy weapons. The AAR screen at the end of the game now reports these as separate values.

Running parallel with this was my other objective - ie to reduce overal cas. I'm pretty much happy with bombardments and on call support. So I then overhauled APer and AArm fire events in great detail. I'm still fine tuning all the fire events but I have significantly reduced overal cas to a more realistic level.

But this has highlighted a deficiency in our reaction code. This relied too heavily on recent cas and with the reduced cas units would not retreat in the face of major attacks as they should. So I have overhauled the reaction code and added a suppression modifier to the unit morale check function. Now if a unit is highly suppressed it will have an increased chance of its morale breaking and thus retreat or rout.

I have yet to rech a point where the balance between getting the right cas outcomes and progress on the battlefield has been achieved. I have used the tutorial scenario as a test bed for this and so far with my limited amount of runs through it looks pretty good. But we need more testing and we need more test data to analyse before I am going to say its good enough. Pavlo is modifying the autotesting code so we can batch run the designated scenario with the specified scenario options. At the moment the scenartio options are randomly chosen. I need to make sure we are comparing oranges with oranges. We also need to design an additional test scenario that is not so heavy in armour as the Tutorial.

A huge amount of work has been done on this and other issues. But we need some more time to finish this off properly. I ask for your patience.

Here are the fixes we have done in our dev builds. These will be rolled into the new release build when it comes out. They don't include the latest work on overhauling the combat system.

Change List for CO2 Dev Build 5.1.31

• Added kStandardEmResupDuration to ScenCommonAI.cpp
• Modified SendTransportColumnCasualtyReport() to include number of vehicles lost
• Reinstated onMapBoss staffCapacity modifier but reduced if from 2.0 to 1.5. This is a compromise between allowing players to command each battalion and having some restraints on the amount of units the player can directly order. A better approach has been identified but it will involve a lot of development work and testing and so will have to wait.
• Ensure AddReinforcementSubForces() handles No Show reinforcements properly. These were still being added to the game in some circumstances.
• Modified ScenSupplyTransportEventDetermineCasualtyLevel(). Reduced the probability of a hits on vehicles in resupply columns. But increased probability that if under fire a column will abort and return to base.
• Added Pavlo Voilov to the credits - take a bow Pavlo!!
• Changed default weather visibility modifiers, significantly reducing visibility in rain, mist, downpour and peasouper conditions.
• Added conversion code to modify weather vis modifiers of all existing maps.
• Converted all maps to version 140 using new default weather vis modifiers.

Change List for CO2 Dev Build 5.1.30

• Fixed breaking change introduced in Rev.1476 (typo in ScenMaker manual filename)
• Renamed WestWall to Westwall folder
• Renamed WestWall to Westwall in the code
• Added fix to FGForceViewDialog that relays keyboard (cursor arrows) events to Win32ScenarioView that currently implements unit selections. This fixes the bug reported by Jim Caravallah on LnL forums about ForceView not handling arrow key events immediately after activation.
• Reduce the night vis modifiers to reflect the findings of historical analysis by US, Canadian and Japanese military science studies conducted around WW2. It's going to be a lot harder to detect enemy at night.
• Convert all maps with new night vis modifiers.
• Update all module installers to include new maps
• Change estab of Brucken Pioniere companies of KG Reich in the Counterstroke in the Swamp scenario (Westwall module)
• Ensure bridge count field in ScenMaker Unit Data\Strength view is updated correctly after estab change. It is now cleared if the new estab does not have an engineer value.
• Ensure changes made to the bombard duration in the Task Edit view are saved correctly
• Added current moon phase text to context popup over current weather image on Control panel
• Converted all maps to use revised Visibility modifiers
• Changed estab for German Buchan Pioniere units in Westwall Clearing the West Bank and Counterstroke in the Swamp scenarios
• Updated Westwall Hamich Ridge scenario
• Added Pavlo to credits list
• Updated all installers
• Updated CO2 Game Manual to version 1.2 - changed Annex A Keyboard Shortcuts to reflect change in use of "z" key. Now Rest orders use the "/" key and "Z" + mouse buttons zoom the map in or out.
• Updated CO2 Keyboard Reference to version 1.2 to reflect change in use of "z" key - see above.

Change List for CO2 Dev Build 5.1.29

• Fixed keyboard accelerators and missing shift + hot keys
• Fixes to the CheckRegistration code so that it works with Dev builds now
• Ensured all references to search header in CheckRegistration use "Modules" instead of "Module. This ensures registration words in dev build.
• Fixed Bitness issue that caused black screen. It now defaults to 32bpp but retains 16bpp support
• Fixed map cache issue with larger displays
• Various Steam support fixes
• Geo Implementation for importing GIS elevation data. Still a work in progress
• Ensured StockFileName cleared if changing file type to something other than 'Derived' in Debug ScenMaker.
• Updated Game Manual reference to version 1.1 in NSIS CO2 Dev Installer
• Removed the doubling modifier for the onMapBoss that was being applied to the orders delay calculation. This ensures there is a real penalty for issuing orders directly to a plethora of units.
• Fixed the bug in the resupply code that prevented bases from sending out resupply runs due to a lack of handling capacity. This was caused by a double dipping of available personnel.
• Ignore recent resup losses during the regular resupply determination event. Recent resup losses only apply to emergency requests.
• Ensured Task StartAt time updated correctly in UI

 

[Iconoclast]

Thank you for the detailed information. Keep up the great work.

 

[Holman]

+1

 

[pekische]

I am looking forward to all these improvements....

 

[GoodGuy]

SITREP 1 Dec 23017 (copied from Steam)
Control panel

• Converted all maps to use revised Visibility modifiers

What are the changes to visibility parameters?
Do they cater for the existence of special purpose recon and artillery observation vechicles (with "long" range scopes for recon and/or scissor scopes as range finder for arty obs), as used by the Germans, for instance?
Do they cater for (superior) German (eg. Tiger II, Panther, Jagdtiger, Flak 8,8 cm) or (halfway decent) Russian (eg. IS-2, some TDs - like ISUs) clarity and range of tank optics?

• Changed estab for German Buchan Pioniere units in Westwall Clearing the West Bank and Counterstroke in the Swamp scenarios

What's a "Buchan" Pionier? A name? A description? Sorry, but I don't get it. And what's the change?

• Geo Implementation for importing GIS elevation data. Still a work in progress

Does this mean that community map designers will be able to import GIS data for their projects, too? Or will it remain a developer-only feature? Just curious.



Keep up the good work. Once there'll be a dismount feature and once tanks will be able to enter light woods, I'll buy every module out there (if compatible).

 

[Shadrach]

What's a "Buchan" Pionier? A name? A description? Sorry, but I don't get it. And what's the change?

Probably means these guys:

Yeah, and it should be Brücken...

 

[jimcarravallah]

What are the changes to visibility parameters?
Do they cater for the existence of special purpose recon and artillery observation vechicles (with "long" range scopes for recon and/or scissor scopes as range finder for arty obs), as used by the Germans, for instance?
Do they cater for (superior) German (eg. Tiger II, Panther, Jagdtiger, Flak 8,8 cm) or (halfway decent) Russian (eg. IS-2, some TDs - like ISUs) clarity and range of tank optics?

From the Description:

. . .

-- Changed default weather visibility modifiers, significantly reducing visibility in rain, mist, downpour and peasouper conditions.

. . . and

-- Reduce the night vis modifiers to reflect the findings of historical analysis by US, Canadian and Japanese military science studies conducted around WW2. It's going to be a lot harder to detect enemy at night.

. . .

In the World War II era, ambient lighting has a greater impact on spotting units than the quality of the optics used to do the sighting.

Where lighting is adequate to spot an object, optics improve the ability to discern the exact nature of what is spotted.

I always have my binoculars available when I walk in the woods.

I spot wildlife by scanning for a shape, color, or movement that is an anomaly for the surroundings. When I encounter one, I focus my binoculars to identify the object and use the zoom to identify what the object is doing. They're useless at night, and limited by fog, mist, snow, and rainy conditions.

 

[GoodGuy]

In the World War II era, ambient lighting has a greater impact on spotting units than the quality of the optics used to do the sighting.

Where lighting is adequate to spot an object, optics improve the ability to discern the exact nature of what is spotted.

I always have my binoculars available when I walk in the woods.

I spot wildlife by scanning for a shape, color, or movement that is an anomaly for the surroundings. When I encounter one, I focus my binoculars to identify the object and use the zoom to identify what the object is doing. They're useless at night, and limited by fog, mist, snow, and rainy conditions.

Thank you. I did not know that the particular line I quoted referred to the night vis modifiers below, I thought they were independent changes (ie. for daylight visibility), so I wondered what the changes were.

Battlefield illumination was used during First World War by British, French and German troops (possibly US troops as well) already, launched by artillery, or mortar-like installations, and it was excessively used (definetly by the Germans .... what about the Allies?) during World War II.

For local illumination flare guns were used, which could fire both illu rounds and signal rounds. The illu rounds were fired from a "Leuchtpistole" (flare gun), where the Fallschirm Leuchtpatrone (flare version for paras) illuminated the battlefield for 15 seconds (according to army manual "H.Dv. 409 Leucht-, Signal- und Schallmittel" from February 28, 1935, and from 1941, some secondary sources say 30 seconds).

Illumination rounds could also be fired from static guns, such as mortars and arty pieces, offering longer illumination durations, due to the bigger size. The gun crews could set the time at which the illumination rounds would disintegrate, release the illumination flare and openened a parachute, which decreased the flare's sink rate instantly. These bigger flares illuminated the battlefield for 30 seconds. Often, cascades of such flares were fired, which sometimes even created visibility environments that came close to daybreak or even daylight. Series of flares (with a certain offset) could then illuminate areas for 10, 20 or 30 minutes.

The German also used colored signal rounds to shift defensive artillery barrages/curtain fire at night, and used Russian signal colors meant as target markers for Russian night bombers against the Russians (see new thread). The Germans used to change color codes with every new mission breifing, but the official army rule was to change it every day.

Example for a daily (or mission specific) definition of color codes, these definitions were pretty popular, afaik:

• 1 red flare = box barrage
  
• 2 red flares = shift fire (forward)
  
• 1 green flare = cease fire
  
• 2 green flares = shift fire (backward)

Leuchtpatrone 41 = flare gun round for battlefield illumination and signals
Fallschirmleuchtpatrone 41 = para version used for illumination only

• There were additional rounds (to enhance communication and reduce misunderstandings/friendly fire), here's a list (uncomplete):
  
• Star bundle round white with single white pre-signal = tactical signal but also used for illumination
  
• Star bundle round red with single red pre-signal = tactical signal
  
• Star bundle round green with single red pre-signal = tactical signal
  
• Star bundle round red + green with single yellow pre-signal = tactical signal
• Star bundle round yellow + red + green = tactical signal
• Star bundle round red with red pre-light = tactical signalSignalpatrone 3 Stern grün = Takt

-----

• smoke round (different colors) = as signal for artillery units (then spotted/processed by the FOB or aerial artillery observer)
  
• whistle round = gas attack
  
• Alarm round = outpost alarm
  
• Measuring round = for artillery measuring troops, to measure wind speed and/or direction by using the army flare gun
  
• Fallschirmpatrone für Windmessung = "para round for wind measuring", same, but for Para units providing weather info for Nebelwerfer units and measuring troops of the artillery by using the para version of the flare gun
  
• Smoke bundle purple = warning signal for tank units (day)
  
• Smoke signal round blue = used during training only, fired by referee; also used to stop tanks that were buttoned up (definetely during training, not sure about combat)

I am not sure whether the star bundles were available for flare guns, or not.

Anyway, back to the battlefield illumination. I am not sure to what extent other nations (Axis and Allies) had used illumination rounds, but I am guessing that they used such rounds. For one or another major offensive the Russians used large long range AA search lights in an attempt to illuminate the respective battlefield. This was put on a giant level during the crossing of the river Oder at the Seelow Heights:

The idea there was to illuminate the multilevel defensive lines on the long slope leading up to the top and to blind the Germans, so that they could rush through the open field and reach the lowest set of trenches before the first daylight. The problem was, that then heavy fog kicked in that reflected the light. This effect created some kind of background light (similar to the technique in some modern TVs) that "painted" a perfect silhouette of every Russian soldier, making it easy for the Germans to aim, while the illumination of German positions was inadequate. According to German veteran accounts, it was like shooting fish in a barrel during the initial phase of the attack, leading to very high Russian losses. Additional smoke clouds created by German HE artillery rounds improved the German situation even more.

There was a similar situation (at full daylight though) during the German siege of Bastogne, where during a German attack fog came right around and behind the German attackers, which then created similar perfect aiming conditions for the American defenders, as most of the German attackers in that sectors had not received white camo. In addition, the troops were told to rush "no matter what", it seems, and even quite some US accounts from that sector resembled statements like "i almost felt sorry for these guys". The grey coats created sharp silhouettes against the white fog, enabling the US defenders to see and engage the Germans before they could spot the defenders.

In the Ardennes sector and in the Hürtgenwald area, US and German forces sometimes faced each other at distances of 50 - 400 meters. Depending on the type of illumination round (arty round, flare gun round) flare altitudes varied, but they could still create conditions that ranged from being able to spot shadows only to highly illuminated sceneries.

All nations tried to improve nightfighting capabilities, and some tried to disrupt the enemy's nightfighting ability, at the same time.
British bombers tried to disrupt German ground and aerial radar to protect their bomber night raids.
The Brits converted Matilda and Grant tanks to what I would call illumination and blinding tanks, where the latter ability was the primary role.
The light of a very strong search light (carbon arc lamp, usually used in light houses and coastal search lights) was bundled and sent through a tall vertical port:

As tactical diversion, these vehicles were called "Canal Defense Lights" (often called CDL later on). The port was adjustable so that it could create a narrow beam of light just several meters wide, or a wide corridor with a max width of 315 meters. At the max width the light was less bright, of course. This bundled (or focused) beam of light had a max range of around 1 kilometer. This thing, I would like to call it "light gun", could create a single flash, a stroboscope light or a a permanent light beam. Testing proved that troops that were used to darkness (with widened pupils) and who looked in the general direction of the tank (before the flash was triggered) then reacted shocked and disorientated when the flash was triggered.

While the monthly journal "The War illustrated“ from November 1945 insisted that these tanks never engaged German units in a mobile offensive role (this statement invites to speculate about a stationary deployment - and actual use), a German TV news station ( https://www.welt.de/geschichte/zwei...t-verschaffte-Briten-wichtigen-Vorsprung.html ) quoted a British soldier of the 35th Tank Brigade (which was equipped with CDL tanks), who stated that he could very well remember getting CDL support during British night attacks. According to the soldier, the results were not really satisfying (means that the desired blinding effect was insufficient), so that the CDLs in his unit were replaced by regular Shermans which then proceeded to engage the regular way. It seems like the CDLs were not used too often in an illumination role, either.
Even though these experimental tanks can be seen as freak tanks or relatives of some of "Hobart's funnies", it's quite interesting to see the different approaches the involved countries pursued.
On some occasions the Germans tried to use their AA search lights to either blind or illuminate US troops in '44.

That said, several nations put quite some effort into creating or improving night fighting abilities (for land, air and sea units), and illumination and signal techniques to enhance night fighting were widely used.

The question is, does the game cater for this, and/or can it be abstracted/ignored?

 

[jimcarravallah]

You raise good points regarding visibility and smoke and night time illumination.

At this point, those tactical devices are at best considered abstracted as part of the visibility calculations as their availability hasn't been accounted for in the Estabs in the ammunition types and / or barrage unit capabilities.

I'd question whether smoke shells or flares have a significant place in an operational level game. Were gun batteries able to put enough ad hoc smoke on the ground to obscure or enough flares in the air to illuminate a multi-kilometer front?

What I'd be more interested in seeing is less abstraction in the communications for the units. There was a technological advantage in some forces based on the allocation of radio technology, and though radio communication equipment is accounted for in the Estabs, there is no advantage derived by having radios distributed in one force when opposing another force that lacks the same communications equipment.

 

[GoodGuy]

Were gun batteries able to put enough ad hoc smoke on the ground to obscure or enough flares in the air to illuminate a multi-kilometer front?

Btw, I edited my previous post and added some sections, so you might want to re-check.

Yes, definetly. This (contemporary) picture was made on a German Army training compound:

http://www.fotocommunity.de/photo/was-ist-das-thomas-b/3788916

The following is part of a picture set created by a member of a German "Marder" (a Bundeswehr Infantry Fighting Vehicle) crew, probably taken around 1978:

The illumination rounds were fired with Carl Gustav recoilless rifles meant to give the dismounted Inf elements some additional AT capabilities. You can see the silhouettes and red lights of 4 Marder tanks at the bottom of the picture. Now, if you imagine that you have a cascade of such flares fired by mortar or artillery units, which travel even longer (on their chutes, from around 300 meters altitude), then you might agree that these flares fired by the recoilless rifles are already pretty good. German WW2 flares were not as bright as modern flares, afaik, as the amount of magnesium etc (whatever mix of substances they used) might have been smaller. His 1970s photo equipment probably wasn't the best, means the actual light level might have been even higher than displayed on the pic.

In his Book "Mein Überlebenskampf im Zweiten Weltkrieg" (2003, translates to "My fight for survival in world war II"), veteran Bernhard Weber describes the feelings and thoughts during night watch:
(My translation)
".... they (the Russians) are firing a deafening barrage from all available guns. The result is - of course - that even before the actual Russian attack our unit suffers light losses. The barrage doesn't last long, the sector gets quiet again. But quiet doesn't mean silence or lack of events, because the Russians illuminate the sector constantly, in contrast to the caution maintained on our side
After the Russian barrage the Russians proceed to put up some entertainment again, using their propaganda loudspeakers to play jaunty German military marches and reading pamphlets which demand to surrender, while promising to get treated well, to receive good food and to be allowed to go home right after the end of the war.
...[ ] .....
An endless rerun of firing and climbing of flares with their glowing and widely visible lights shows me, as a grunt in the dark night, the rough layout of the frontline on the left and on the right of our Coy, Bn, Rgt etc., which - during daylight - I can only assume from my mole view position in my foxhole. It is then calming to see that we are not half surrounded or completely surrounded, like during the great retreat in summer 1944, out of the Pripjet swamps in Group Center's sector, where we moved westward as a wandering pocket at times, after all, while the ring around us had to be broken by us or with help from outside units in grim fights time and time again.
You rather don't talk about it openly, but I think that - in secret - many of the flares are not fired to illuminate local sectors at night, but because of the inner fear of the individual soldier, where he believes that he is facing a phenonemon, an invisible monster all by himself and where he believes that he has to be on the watch constantly in the defensive position, in order not to get grabbed (by the monster)."

EDIT: This proves that flares also had a psychological effect. It calmed the troops.

Sidenote: That might actually explain why quite some Germans hated British commandos. They felt like the commandos, with their black outfit and gear, were gutless backstabbers that needed the darkness for their sneaky operations.

Anyway, flares were also fired in a sneaky random fashion say at calm fronts (eg. Ardennes before the BFTB), where the distance between German and US foxholes amounted to something between 100 and 300 meters only, and which were then followed by surprise MG and rifle fire that lasted less than a minute.

EDIT: British artillery barrage at El Alamein, conducted at night. Looks like a mix of explosions and descending flares in the distance:

 

[kipanderson]

Dave,

thanks.. all very impressive stuff.

Look forward to it, thanks again.

All the best,
Kip.

 

[GoodGuy]

You raise good points regarding visibility and smoke and night time illumination.

What I'd be more interested in seeing is less abstraction in the communications for the units. There was a technological advantage in some forces based on the allocation of radio technology, and though radio communication equipment is accounted for in the Estabs, there is no advantage derived by having radios distributed in one force when opposing another force that lacks the same communications equipment.

What disadvantages do you have in mind?
Like say the fact that in certain French tank units only every 4th tank had a radio? Or the initial Russian T-34 tank production batch, where radios were in short supply (and obviously expensive), so that only the Coy commander received a radio for his command tank?

Some nations (sometimes even changing from theater to theater) and commanders deployed their tanks differently, say they split their forces (maybe even into platoons), while others commited Coys or even Bns as a whole.
In Africa, the Germans held back the Pz.IV's with the long barreled guns, as they used them to rectify situations, cover crippled Pz.III's or take over the fight where the Pz. III's couldn't penetrate British tanks (say a Matilda), initially.
EDIT: So, you can imagine how such forces suffered, if they were split and if they only had 1 or 2 tanks equipped with a radio, such groups were not able to cooperate well during a given battle/encounter.
The game does not allow for splitting, and it does not render communication deficits/problems, either.

EDIT: So, early historical tank coys where only every 4th or even the just the command tank was equipped with a radio cannot be simulated, if - in the game - you cannot breakdown the Coy body, and if radio equipment failure/absence is not rendered. The player has to commit the company as a whole.

While this reduces the possibilities for manoeuvre and flanking for the human player, it is what it is, right now. Still, radio failure/absence could be abstracted and incorporated in the game. The knowledge about the radio equipment allocation should then persuade the designer of the estabs/scenario to cater for the effects of the absence of high volumes of communication equipment, though. For instance, cohesion and effectiveness of such Coy could (and should) be reduced (as a permanent negative modifier, imho), so that the player cannot "pamper" or "pimp" a unit's coh./eff. values by letting it rest for say 6 days in a row. The morale, combat power, stubborness etc. may still be high, but if a lack of communication (equipment) and "teamplay" (as a result of missing radios) is present, such unit cannot cooperate and perform effectively.

What i would like to see is rather the actual "physical" effect. Tanks with damaged radio equipement, recon elements (small scout cars) with close range radio equipment cannot report their own positions during deep thrusts, nor report sightings to higher echelons, unless spotted by friendly units or unless they reach friendly lines.
In 1944, the Russians performed massive pushes, with daily pushes of 30-80 kilometers. The collapse of the German Army Group Center resulted in a territorial gain of 600 kilometers, until offensive operations were halted. During the daily pushes, fast units temporarily disappeared from the Army's or Front's "radar", until the respective unit trains and infantry elements had caught up. Same with the airborne landings in Normandy. Eisenhower did not have too many infos about the paras' progress, as Allied shipping, that could have picked up short range radio calls from the paras, had not reached the French coast, yet.
Very few units were able to send in reports, some even used the Resistance's or Allied spies' long range radios.

Thing is, the human player is pretty much both, an operational commander and a Coy commander, as he sees each and everything, whereas a historical para commander or a fast unit commander remained "blind" until the point where radio messages, field telephone calls, teletype pamphlets and motorbike messenger notes started to pour in, unless he was with the spearhead of the division/corps/army, or with its main force.


I think there would be a way to simulate at least half of the feelings/situations an operational airborne commander had to go through:
For para drops, airborne units on the ground could be set to be visible after landing and while they are still reorg'ing, and then set to be invisible once they start to march towards their objectives. The Coys would then only be visible (permanently) again upon first enemy contact. The units would also have to follow a script routine that would let them follow a predefined (fastest, covered, etc) path to the objective.
That would be very thrilling and simulate at least half of the operational airborne commander's dilemma (not being able to influence events, until radio contact or messenger contact has been re-established. The British paras in Arnhem had difficulties to reach the supreme command, as a vital amount of their radios had the wrong parts (chrystals? tubes?), iirc. They were cut off from long range communition, initially.

 

[TMO]

Don't forget Monty's Moonlight.

Regards

Tim

 

[jimcarravallah]

What disadvantages do you have in mind?
Like say the fact that in certain French tank units only every 4th tank had a radio? Or the initial Russian T-34 tank production batch, where radios were in short supply (and obviously expensive), so that only the Coy commander received a radio for his command tank?

Some nations (sometimes even changing from theater to theater) and commanders deployed their tanks differently, say they split their forces (maybe even into platoons), while others commited Coys or even Bns as a whole.
In Africa, the Germans held back the Pz.IV's with the long barreled guns, as they used them to rectify situations, cover crippled Pz.III's or take over the fight where the Pz. III's couldn't penetrate British tanks (say a Matilda), initially.
EDIT: So, you can imagine how such forces suffered, if they were split and if they only had 1 or 2 tanks equipped with a radio, such groups were not able to cooperate well during a given battle/encounter.
The game does not allow for splitting, and it does not render communication deficits/problems, either.

EDIT: So, early historical tank coys where only every 4th or even the just the command tank was equipped with a radio cannot be simulated, if - in the game - you cannot breakdown the Coy body, and if radio equipment failure/absence is not rendered. The player has to commit the company as a whole.

While this reduces the possibilities for manoeuvre and flanking for the human player, it is what it is, right now. Still, radio failure/absence could be abstracted and incorporated in the game. The knowledge about the radio equipment allocation should then persuade the designer of the estabs/scenario to cater for the effects of the absence of high volumes of communication equipment, though. For instance, cohesion and effectiveness of such Coy could (and should) be reduced (as a permanent negative modifier, imho), so that the player cannot "pamper" or "pimp" a unit's coh./eff. values by letting it rest for say 6 days in a row. The morale, combat power, stubborness etc. may still be high, but if a lack of communication (equipment) and "teamplay" (as a result of missing radios) is present, such unit cannot cooperate and perform effectively.

What i would like to see is rather the actual "physical" effect. Tanks with damaged radio equipement, recon elements (small scout cars) with close range radio equipment cannot report their own positions during deep thrusts, nor report sightings to higher echelons, unless spotted by friendly units or unless they reach friendly lines.
In 1944, the Russians performed massive pushes, with daily pushes of 30-80 kilometers. The collapse of the German Army Group Center resulted in a territorial gain of 600 kilometers, until offensive operations were halted. During the daily pushes, fast units temporarily disappeared from the Army's or Front's "radar", until the respective unit trains and infantry elements had caught up. Same with the airborne landings in Normandy. Eisenhower did not have too many infos about the paras' progress, as Allied shipping, that could have picked up short range radio calls from the paras, had not reached the French coast, yet.
Very few units were able to send in reports, some even used the Resistance's or Allied spies' long range radios.

Thing is, the human player is pretty much both, an operational commander and a Coy commander, as he sees each and everything, whereas a historical para commander or a fast unit commander remained "blind" until the point where radio messages, field telephone calls, teletype pamphlets and motorbike messenger notes started to pour in, unless he was with the spearhead of the division/corps/army, or with its main force.


I think there would be a way to simulate at least half of the feelings/situations an operational airborne commander had to go through:
For para drops, airborne units on the ground could be set to be visible after landing and while they are still reorg'ing, and then set to be invisible once they start to march towards their objectives. The Coys would then only be visible (permanently) again upon first enemy contact. The units would also have to follow a script routine that would let them follow a predefined (fastest, covered, etc) path to the objective.
That would be very thrilling and simulate at least half of the operational airborne commander's dilemma (not being able to influence events, until radio contact or messenger contact has been re-established. The British paras in Arnhem had difficulties to reach the supreme command, as a vital amount of their radios had the wrong parts (chrystals? tubes?), iirc. They were cut off from long range communition, initially.

I'm thinking in term of orders delay, and not only for the armored vehicles.

The germ of what communications did for the forces is built into orders delay and unit cohesion.

I'd like to see some adjustment to the times in orders delay based on the availability of portable communications equipment and dispersion of equipment to echelons of command, a command possessing a radio theoretically in the commander's vehicle or headquarters unit, being more responsive to an order than one which does not possess a radio, and has to rely on other signaling to accept changes in its orders.

Units which have vehicles or allocation of radio equipment as part of their Estabs would be more responsive to a command than a unit which did not have the same allocation of equipment, e.g. if only the battalion staff car had a radio the force below that battalion wouldn't react as quickly to an order as a battalion whose headquarters and each company command possesses a radio.

Units with radios allocated to the lowest level of command would gain a cohesion bonus over those which don't have the same allocation of equipment.

You mention the broadcast range of the equipment, and that's why I'd focus on the orders delay as a primary tool. Though an operation is controlled based on the command and control calculation for the "on map boss" level for the human, the delivery of orders to the appropriate echelon is addressed by orders delay based on distances covered, normal vs. outside the chain of command, and steps down in the echelon of command.

Radios dispersed at the various echelon levels would reduce the impact of delay.

As far as Eisenhower's issue with the paratroopers, that wouldn't exist in the game, as the command priority is always assigned at the on map boss level instead of the theater level.

The only present CO2 scenario I can think of where the abstraction wouldn't work is in "From the Meuse to the Rhine," where the British paratroopers were hung way out on a limb in Arnhem and the primary on map boss is in the southern regions of Nijmegen well beyond portable radio range.

 

[Dave 'Arjuna' O'Connor]

Re comms effects on orders delay. That is already built in in that motorised units get a beneficial modifier on the amount of orders dealy to reflect the fact that they had a much better allocation of radios.

 

[GoodGuy]

Re comms effects on orders delay. That is already built in in that motorised units get a beneficial modifier on the amount of orders dealy to reflect the fact that they had a much better allocation of radios.

Interesting, so it's in there already. But then units with a lack of such equipment don't get a penalty? A lack of equipment should cause the cohesion to be lowered. No?

 

[Dave 'Arjuna' O'Connor]

OK I just rechecked the code inside GetForceProcessOrderDuration(). It reads as:

pf motorisedMod = pf(1.0);
pf motorisedRatio = forceValues->GetMotorisedRatio();

if( motorisedRatio < pf(1.0) )
{
motorisedMod = FPCommonAI::GetValueInRange( motorisedRatio,
pf(1.0),
pf(1.25),
kHighIsBad );
}

In other words, non-motorised units are penalised and motorised units are not. Non-mot units without any vehicles will pay a +25% penalty and this will be tapered down as the amount of vehicles rises.

 

[GoodGuy]

OK I just rechecked the code inside GetForceProcessOrderDuration(). It reads as:

pf motorisedMod = pf(1.0);
pf motorisedRatio = forceValues->GetMotorisedRatio();

if( motorisedRatio < pf(1.0) )
{
motorisedMod = FPCommonAI::GetValueInRange( motorisedRatio,
pf(1.0),
pf(1.25),
kHighIsBad );
}

In other words, non-motorised units are penalised and motorised units are not. Non-mot units without any vehicles will pay a +25% penalty and this will be tapered down as the amount of vehicles rises.

Very nice. This leads to the question how non--radio communication is handled code-wise.
Historically, the Germans had a lot of radios in motorized pools, and they still had a sufficient/good distribution level of radios in non-motorized units, but they actually had established a routine where they switched to using field telephones in secured sectors, but even right at frontlines asap. Afaik, it was not about a lack of radios, but rather about denying (and the fear that) the enemy to (could) read German radio chatter.
Once a given position/village was taken, the first thing a Coy's signal platoon would do, was to establish telephone connections to the Bn HQ and (from the FOB or one of his B-posts) to the Artillery section/regiment, even though the FOBs had radios at their disposal, and even though more sophisticated B-posts had radios.
The Russians had a somewhat similar routine, but they used it because the initial lack (say during the 1st and until the 2nd year) of radios had to be compensated, somehow.

For the infantry, the Bundeswehr resumed this entire routine.

So, with the German setups, a lower amount of radios (say if compared to the American situation in NW Europe in 1944-45), did not necessarily mean a lack of communication means, and therefor should not be panalized in non-motorized units.
Does the game consider this setup, or does it hand out penalties for this?