The bomber campaign was not as decisive as promised when it was initiated, but the attrition to the industrial capacity over the years took it's toll or the targeted facilities would have continued to be returned to service after May 1944 and the fuel replenishment wouldn't have ended in November 1944.
Yes, correct, the air campaign against industrial targets proved to be a constant drain on German armament replacement/supply distribution efforts. The bombing campaign forced the Germans to move plants/production to safer areas (eg. East Germany, Bavaria, Austria or Czech). In some cases the movers took several months. So a large share of the Allied bombing effort disrupted production plans and replenishment schedules. Example from 1943: The USAAF strikes on the Messerschmitt plant in Regensburg and the ball-bearing plant in Schweinfurt (110 km east of Frankfurt) inflicted heavy damage and resulted in a somewhat serious loss of output in Schweinfurt, but Speer compensated most of the production loss by buying ball-bearings in Sweden and Switzerland, plus Germany had produced large stocks, as they knew how important they were. The factor here: time "only". The impact on tank/fighter production was marginal, I'd say, the impact on the ball-bearing production itself was mediocre, as the production output decreased by 33% for a short amount of time, at least. The bomber formation (220 B-17) sent to Schweinfurt lost 36 B-17, 27 B-17 were damaged beyond repair and used as spare part donors afterwards.
The constant repairs ate up resources and manpower ofc, where the latter was partially compensated by slave labour.
You should keep in mind that
Germany's armament production output peaked in 1944, though. This was a result of streamlining designs and production lines, and - partially - of relocating some of the industrial capacity (see above) and redirecting orders to other contractors.
The loss of the refining capacity that couldn't be repaired after May 1944 most likely lead to the end of fuel distribution once reserves were exhausted in November of 1944.
In turn, the failing fuel production was a direct result of the loss of the rumanian oil fields, the loss/reduction of refinery output (Ploiesti in Romania, Rijka in Yugoslavia and German refineries) and the loss of the majority of coal hydrogenation plant output (the Germans planned to move all their hydrogenation output to protected underground facilities, but the output of the few completed underground versions remained marginal and that output didn't materialize before March/April 1945, iirc) caused by the US bombing efforts and the subsequent Soviet onslaught on the ground.
Aviation fuel: the Germans lived off of the huge aviation fuel stocks captured in France in 1940, the monthly aviation fuel production never met the actual monthly consumption for years, so that the first aerial units had to be kept on the ground as early as late 1943. Aviation fuel was still available - even in late 1944 - it was distributed unevenly and fuel reserves were held back, though, Goering hoarded large stocks in and near Berlin and at other places even in late 1944, while entire sectors and fighter units had almost zero fuel in spring or summer 1944, already.
Motor engine gasoline: The gasoline reserves captured in France gave the Germans a giant cushion during the following years, but since the production never met the demand/actual consumption and since civil consumption was allowed until 1942, the stocks started to seriously dwindle in late 1943, resulting in increasingly uneven/unreliable fuel distribution . The first major problem with fuel distribution (not production) came up in summer 1942, where an entire Corps was immobilized in Russia, iirc, because the German distribution network (and the railroad system in Russia) was congested. Only the gigantic vehicle losses of 1944 in Russia and in France lowered the consumption to a level, where the production output (almost) matched the total consumption for once in August (iirc), before the production crippled in November. Basically, the Germans had to draw from those captured stocks every month to bridge the output gap, since 1940. The stocks hit an all-time low around November '44. The Germans had to search gas stations all over Germany for remaining ("idle") gasoline and move the collected fuel to the supply storage area (set up on the right bank of the river Rhein), they had to take fuel out of vehicles/or hold back fuel from fighting units on the Eastern Front and they had to collect the meager output from operational refineries to stock enough gasoline to support the first few days of combat in the Battle of the Bulge, while still trying to supply at least some combat units in other sectors (eg. during and after Market Garden in the Netherlands). If I am not mistaken, the collection/hoarding for the "Wacht am Rhein" offensive (BFTB) took 3 months.
The majority of the German refinery facilities were "soft" versions:
I live around 1.8 miles from a refinery (Union Fuel AG back then, built in 1937, Shell nowadays) that was one of the major coal hydrogenation plants in Germany. The plant was one of the very few refineries with a small protected underground part that could still operate (or be reactivated quickly) after a bombardment, and which then guaranteed a certain minimum output, at least, afaik.
Plants in other areas were pure surface facilities, means pure soft targets, where it took quite some effort to get their output up again (until the next bombardment). The US did not focus on this industry sector (refineries processing crude oil or intermediate products and coal hydrogenation plants producing additional fuel, where the refineries were spread over 4 countries) before 1944. Two vital reasons: 1) The limited range of the escort fighters, which was was fixed in spring 1944, when fighters with external fuel tanks became the standard. 2) US Bomber Wings stationed in Italy could not be escorted to the oil fields and refineries in Romania (for the most part), Hungary and Yugoslavia, plus the focus was put on targeting armament production facilities.
The biggest hydrogenation plant in Germany, Ruhland-Schwarzheide (East Germany) was hit hard on 21 June, 1944, 100 Allied bombers heavily damaged the plant, the mission was part of Operation Frantic (shuttle bombing missions where US planes landed + rearmed in the Sovietunion). KZ inmates were forced to repair the plant after the raid, following raids knocked out the plant. At the end of the war, 75% of the plant was destroyed. The plant resided at the Eastern tip of the industrial belt that was protected by more than 1,000 AA guns and at or slightly over the range limit of regular bombing runs (where the units returned to England), until airfields that supported large bomber operations in France and Belgium became available. The Russians made the US bomber units avoid German aircraft production facilities in East Germany, as they tried to get a hold of intact facilities, in an attempt to grab samples, tools and technology for their own aviation industry.
The railroad network collapsed around November 1944, this turned the proper long distance distribution of the remaining stocks and the little refinery output that was left into an almost impossible mission.
The reason here: Allied aviation (mostly US) could now use airfields in France and Belgium and be tasked with frequent aerial tactical bombardments or fighter raids (targeting locomotives, trains, important railroad lines and railroad stations/hubs in West and Southwest Germany). The rest of the German fighter force was mostly absent, with a last serious effort put up during the Battle of the Bulge. Starting in November, the daily operation of German railroad assets involved frequent detours, moving at night only, pulling destroyed locomotives off the tracks, repairing tracks, retrieving repairable locomotives and putting derailed trains back on the tracks. Relocation of troops and armor could then easily take 4-7 days, where it used to take let's say 2 days before the campaign, for example.
community.simtropolis.com
